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The work of Jeff McMahan has revitalised discussion of just war theory with its rejection 
of the moral equality of combatants. The main aim of this thesis is to explore and develop 
McMahan’s work and recent challenges to it. I do this in four chapters. First, I outline 
McMahan’s account of liability to attack which subsequently shows why the moral 
equality of combatants is false. I defend his account of liability to attack from problems 
raised by Yitzhak Benbaji and Thomas Hurka. Second, I discuss developments by 
McMahan to the in bello condition of proportionality. I suggest that the features 
McMahan introduces, though innovative, do not go far enough and ultimately argue for 
David Rodin’s multi-factor account. Third, I defend Seth Lazar’s responsibility dilemma 
from objections by McMahan and Bradley Strawser. Fourth, I combine McMahan’s 
understanding of responsibility with Tony Honoré’s outcome responsibility and after 
establishing an account of collective responsibility argue that unjust noncombatants can 
be liable to intentional attack due to being collectively outcome responsible for the threat 
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Arguments relating to the moral evaluation of war can be categorised into three main 
positions: Realism, Pacifism, and Just War Theory. Realists think that moral 
considerations do not apply to war; pacifists think that wars are (nearly) always unjust; 
and just war theorists think that wars can sometimes be just.1 It is the latter position that 
is perhaps the most popular among philosophers and is the framework in which I will be 
working in this thesis.  
 
Just war theorists have traditionally identified two sets of conditions that determine 
whether a war is just. The first, jus ad bellum, pertains to the justice of going to war, 
whereas the second, jus in bello, pertains to the justice of participating in a war. Recent 
work has also focused on a third set of conditions: just post bellum, which pertain to the 
justice of ending a war.2 These conditions will not be discussed in this thesis. The 
relationship between these sets of conditions is traditionally thought to be subject to the 
‘independence thesis’.3 This states that the in bello principles and ad bellum principles 
are logically independent, with the ad bellum principles applying to states and their 
leaders and the in bello principles applying to combatants within a war. More specifically 
it means that in bello rights and duties are independent of the ad bellum justice of a 
particular war. This means that a war can meet one set of conditions but not the other. An 
example of this is the conflict in World War II between Japan and the United States. The 
participation of the United States in the war was justified under the ad bellum just cause 
condition, yet in fighting the war they violated the in bello proportionality condition with 
the dropping of the atomic bombs.4  This is because, as Michael Walzer points out: “We 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a classic realist account see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. For the classic pacifist 
position see Robert Holmes, On War and Morality.  
2 See, for example, Gary J. Bass ‘Jus Post Bellum’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2004, pp. 
384-412. 
3 David Rodin and Henry Shue, ‘Introduction’, in David Rodin and Henry Shue (eds), Just and Unjust 
Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-18, at p. 
3. 
4 Some historians argue that it was in fact the declaration of war by the Soviet Union that was decisive in 
the Japanese decision to surrender: Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 226. 
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draw a line between the war itself, for which soldiers are not responsible, and the conduct 
of the war, for which they are responsible, at least within their own sphere of activity.”5 
So the traditional view of just war theory demarcates between the two sets of principles 
with jus ad bellum applying to the overall justice of the war and jus in bello applying to 
the combatants fighting the war.   
 
The independence thesis works with the ‘symmetry thesis’ to establish the moral equality 
of combatants. The symmetry thesis states that the rights and obligations of combatants 
fighting in war are the same.  When combined with the independence thesis this 
establishes the moral equality of combatants by separating the ad bellum and in bello 
considerations, thereby allowing combatants equal rights. This is a key aspect of the 
traditional view of just war theory and has the important implication that combatants on 
both sides of a conflict are morally permitted to kill one another.  
 
The traditional view of just war theory is explained most clearly and comprehensively by 
Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars.6 This book revived interest in the morality of 
war and has reignited debate in the topic. An important recent challenge to Walzer has 
come from David Rodin. In War and Self-Defense Rodin directly challenges the ad 
bellum assumption that the individual right of self-defence translates directly into a 
national or communal right of self-defence.7 This is an ad bellum assumption because 
self-defence is taken to be the paradigm example of a just cause for war. Rodin’s critique 
poses a significant problem for just war theory, as if wars cannot be justified by self-
defence then it seems to entail that many wars, at least as they are currently fought 
between states, cannot be justified. 
 
Although I shall be discussing some of Rodin’s view below, my focus in this thesis is on 
the work of Jeff McMahan. In a series of papers and in his book Killing in War 
McMahan challenges the independence thesis, arguing that ad bellum judgements have 
implications for the permissibility of war acts.8 He does this by showing that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Fourth Edition), 
(Basic Books: 2006), p. 38.  
6 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. 
7 David Rodin, War and Self-Defense (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
8 See in particular Jeff McMahan, ‘Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War’, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1994, pp. 193-221; Jeff McMahan, ‘Just Cause for War’, Ethics & International 
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traditional account of liability to attack is false, and develops his own account of liability 
to attack. This account has significant implications for the moral equality of combatants 
and the permissibility of killing in war. As such, McMahan’s work demands a re-
examination of the traditional in bello rights and obligations. In this thesis I focus 
focusing on the in bello issues that McMahan raises by examining his account and 
exploring some of the implications of his view. I will not be putting forward a sustained 
critique of McMahan. Rather, my chapters are relatively self-sufficient, sharing a 
common theme but focusing on distinct issues that each deserve particular attention. 
 
Before I set out the overview of the thesis it will help to clarify some of the key terms. 
A central theme in this thesis is responsibility and as such, it is important to clarify three 
different types of responsibility. First, there is ‘causal responsibility’. This is when an 
agent is merely causally connected to an event and we would not hold them liable or 
accountable for the event. An example of this is throwing an orange pip over a cliff and 
setting off a landslide. Second, there is what Seth Lazar terms ‘agent-responsibility’ and 
what Tony Honoré and David Miller call ‘outcome responsibility’.9 This incorporates 
causal responsibility and adds that the event can be appropriately attributed to the 
responsible agency of the agent such that it is appropriate for the agent to bear the costs 
or burdens of their actions. McMahan thinks that agent-responsibility (he simply calls it 
moral responsibility) is sufficient for liability to attack. Third, there is what Lazar calls 
‘maximal moral responsibility’. This incorporates the previous two types and also 
includes the attribution of blame or praise to the agent. So an agent is maximally morally 
responsible for an event if it is appropriate to blame or praise them for it. If they are 
blameworthy then we can say that they are culpable for the action. In this thesis 
particular attention will be paid to the second type of responsibility and I discuss it in 
more detail in Chapter Four. 
 
Another set of terms that needs clarification is those that describe those who do and do 
not participate in war. I follow McMahan and use the term ‘just combatant’ to identify a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, pp. 1-21; Jeff McMahan, ‘The Ethics of Killing in War’, Ethics, Vol. 114, 
No. 4, 2004, pp. 693-733; and McMahan, Killing in War. 
9 See Seth Lazar, ‘The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War: A Review Essay’, Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2010, pp. 180-213, at p. 184; Tony Honoré, ‘Responsibility and Luck. The Moral 
Basis of Strict Liability’, in Responsibility and Fault (Hart Publishing, 1999), pp. 14-40, at p. 14; and 




soldier, airman, sailor or any other person who takes up arms whilst fighting a morally 
justified war. Similarly an ‘unjust combatant’ refers to those combatants fighting a 
morally unjustified war. When a state (or nation) is fighting a justified war the members 
of the population who are not personally taking part in the conflict (i.e. all those who are 
not combatants) are referred to as ‘just noncombatants’. Again, noncombatants whose 
state is fighting an unjustified war are called ‘unjust noncombatants’. The category of 
noncombatant is essentially the same as the category of civilian; the term ‘noncombatant’ 
is used to emphasise the difference with combatants. 
Overview of the Chapters 
My thesis is divided into four chapters. In Chapter One I argue against the moral equality 
of combatants. I start by looking at the traditional account of liability to attack in war and 
McMahan’s criticism of it. The traditional account states that merely posing a threat is 
sufficient for liable to attack. McMahan argues against it by showing that it has no 
plausibility outside the context of war. He argues instead for an account of liability to 
attack that identifies liability as lying in responsibility for an unjust threat of harm. I 
suggest a modification to McMahan’s account of liability to attack in response to a 
problem raised by Yitzhak Benbaji that brings the problem of innocent threats to the fore. 
After explaining why McMahan’s account renders the moral equality of combatants false 
I defend McMahan from an objection by Thomas Hurka. 
 
In Chapter Two I look at the recent development of the in bello proportionality 
requirement. I trace its development from the traditional understanding of Henry 
Sidgwick and Walzer to a revision by Hurka. I introduce McMahan’s account of narrow 
and wide proportionality which highlight the relevance of liability and intention to 
proportionality judgements. Following Rodin’s lead I criticse McMahan for not including 
more factors. After discussion of some of those extra factors I ultimately argue in favour 
of Rodin’s approach to proportionality, which involves the considering factors relevant to 
both the defending and attacking agents. 
 
In Chapter Three I defend Seth Lazar’s Responsibility Dilemma. Lazar argues that 
McMahan is inconsistent in the way he applies his account of liability to attack to unjust 
combatants and unjust noncombatants. A consistent application will leave McMahan 
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facing two horns of a dilemma: either contingent pacifism or total war. I look at 
responses by McMahan and Bradley Strawser to the dilemma and show why their various 
criticisms do not defeat the dilemma. 
 
In Chapter Four I argue that McMahan’s focus on individual responsibility means that he 
misunderstands the nature of the war time threat. I argue that war is properly understood 
as a collective threat.  I also argue that McMahan’s understanding of moral responsibility 
is the same as Honoré’s outcome responsibility. I develop an account of collective 
outcome responsibility based on Toni Erskine’s work and ultimately argue that many 
unjust noncombatants are collectively outcome responsible for the threat their state poses 
in war which means they can be liable to intentional attack. This conclusion is 
particularly radical and I justify it in part through arguing that it can be effective to kill 
noncombatants as a means of achieving the just cause. 
 
I turn now to my first chapter and the challenge of showing why the moral equality of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Rejecting the Moral Equality of 
Combatants 
In this chapter I am going to set out some of the main arguments surrounding two key 
contemporary in bello issues: the moral equality of combatants and the moral 
permissibility of killing in war. The moral equality of combatants is constituted by two 
theses.10 The first is the ‘symmetry thesis’, which states that the in bello rights and 
obligations are the same for combatants on both sides of the conflict. In particular they 
are both morally permitted to kill the opposing combatants, hence the moral equality. The 
second thesis is the ‘independence thesis’, which states that the in bello rights and 
obligations of combatants during war are independent of ad bellum conclusions of the 
justice of the war. So the moral equality of combatants says that combatants on each side 
of a conflict are equally permitted to kill each other in war because their in bello rights 
and obligations are the same. This is in part due to the fact that in bello rights are 
independent of ad bellum considerations. One of the main reasons for the acceptance of 
the moral equality of combatants is because of the belief that in war merely posing a 
threat is sufficient for liability to attack. Combatants on each side threaten the other; 
hence they are each permitted to kill the other. In Killing in War Jeff McMahan 
challenges the moral equality of combatants by developing an alternative theory of 
liability which gives different results for the moral permissibility of killing in war. He 
argues that the criterion for liability to attack is moral responsibility for an unjust threat 
of harm.  
 
My discussion will first outline more detail the arguments around the moral equality of 
combatants, the traditional understanding of liability to attack, and then McMahan’s 
account of liability to attack.  Second, I will set out a response to McMahan based on 
Yitzhak Benbaji’s ‘sleeping soldiers’ thought experiment. Having overcome the 
problems raised by sleeping soldiers I will focus on innocent threats and then argue for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Rodin and Shue, ‘Introduction’, pp. 2-3. 
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slight modification to McMahan’s account in order to accommodate the innocent threats. 
Third, I will show why McMahan’s account demonstrates that unjust combatants are 
unable to satisfy the in bello requirement of discrimination. This will show why the 
moral equality of combatants is to be rejected. Fourth, I will look at Thomas Hurka’s 
challenge to McMahan and argue that Hurka’s challenge fails in establishing the moral 
equality of combatants. 
1.1  The Moral Equality of Combatants and the Permissibility 
of Killing 
The main way a war is prosecuted is through attacking and killing enemy combatants.  
The most important implication of the symmetry thesis is that it entails that combatants 
on both sides of the conflict have an equal right to kill the combatants on the opposing 
side. Provided they do not do so in ways that violate other in bello principles they are 
morally permitted to kill enemy soldiers.  
 
Two arguments, one principled and one pragmatic, support the moral equality of 
combatants. The first, which directly supports the independence thesis, is that the 
responsibility for fighting in a war lies solely with the leader. The nature of political 
obedience is such that we don’t blame a combatant who fights for his own state.11 A 
combatant, being a loyal citizen, is in principle not responsible for the policy of the state. 
That responsibility lies with the sovereign and allows the soldier to accurately channel 
the English soldier Bates in Henry V who says “Our obedience to the King wipes the 
crime of it out of us.”12  Bates’ line is an instance of the independence thesis. The justice 
of going to war is governed by the ad bellum principles for which the responsibility of 
satisfying lies with the sovereign. The fact that the responsibility lies with the sovereign 
is why the moral equality of combatants says that a combatant does not act impermissibly 
by fighting in a war that doesn’t satisfy the ad bellum conditions. 
 
The second argument is grounded in a pragmatic desire to maintain war as a “rule-
governed activity.”13 Walzer identifies war as both a legal and a moral condition which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 39. 
12 William Shakespeare, Henry V, Andrew Gurr (ed.), (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 
Updated Edition 2005), IV.i.121-2, at p. 162. 
13 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 21. 
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permits soldiers and armies representing at least two distinct groups to engage in a 
conflict with armed force.14 Part of this condition involves war being a rule-governed 
activity, with the rules, as codified in international law and drawn from the jus in bello, 
applying equally to all involved in the conflict. If, Walzer warns us, the equal right to kill 
were abolished, then “war as a rule-governed activity would disappear and be replaced 
by crime and punishment, by evil conspiracies and military law enforcement.”15 Though 
not explicitly stated, the implication seems to be that regulated conflict, i.e. war as it is 
currently generally practised, is better than unregulated conflict. This entails that the right 
of soldiers to kill enemy soldiers is a fundamental requirement of regulated conflict. This 
highlights a tension between just war theorists regarding the motivations for the theory. 
The tension arises between developing the principles of just war theory to limit an 
inevitable evil and between simply determining morally appropriate conduct. The former 
is declared explicitly by Allen Buchanan who states: “The chief practical aim of Just War 
Theory is to constrain war making.”16 Anthony Coates also supports this, stating that the 
independence thesis has little logical support and is primarily justified consequentially by 
its restraint of war.17 These views contrast with what James Turner Johnson tells us the 
original just war question, as framed by medieval Christian Theologians, was: “Is it ever 
justifiable for Christians to participate in War?”18  Contemporary proponents of the latter 
position draw inspiration from the self-defence literature where the motivation is not to 
limit harm, but is rather to simply identify when harm is and is not permissible. Walzer’s 
remarks indicate that he is advancing the moral equality of combatants with the former 
motivation, of limiting the harm, in mind. The problem with this more pragmatic 
approach is that the claims it entails are often vulnerable to principled attacks. Jeff 
McMahan uses such a strategy against the moral equality of combatants.  
 
In Killing in War Jeff McMahan sets out to explicitly reject the independence thesis. He 
argues that whether or not a combatant is fighting a just or unjust war is relevant to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 41. 
15 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 41. 
16 Allen Buchanan, ‘Institutionalizing the Just War’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2006, pp. 
2-38, at p. 3. 
17 Coates argues that revising jus ad bellum is the key to the moral restraint of war in: Anthony Coates, ‘Is 
the Independent Application of jus in bello the Way to Limit War?’, in David Rodin and Henry Shue (eds), 
Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)  
pp. 176-192, at p. 177.  
18 James Turner Johnson,  Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. xxv. 
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whether their killing is morally permissible. In particular his focus on the moral 
permissibility of killing looks at what is required for someone to be liable to attack. 
Directly attacking the independence thesis allows McMahan to undermine the symmetry 
thesis and thereby the moral equality of combatants. This is because if ad bellum 
considerations affect in bello judgements then it is likely that just and unjust combatants 
will have different in bello rights and obligations. For McMahan it is generally the case 
that it is morally wrong to fight in war that lacks a just cause.19 This is because he sees 
the just cause requirement as one of the necessary conditions for the jus ad bellum justice 
of war. He understands a just cause as an aim that satisfies two conditions: “(1) that it 
may permissibly be pursued by means of war, and (2) that the reason why this is so is at 
least in part that those against whom the war is fought have made themselves morally 
liable to military attack.”20 It is the second condition that needs to be explained, and 
McMahan spends time developing the idea of being liable to attack. The reason that 
McMahan focuses on liability to attack is because it allows him to answer the question of 
when it is permissible to kill people in war. McMahan is right to focus on this condition 
as what allows people to be killed in war also serves as an important part of the 
justification for going to war. If it is not permissible to kill people in war then it will be 
impermissible to go to war; there will be no just cause. Part of what it means to have a 
just cause for war is that it is permissible to pursue that cause in a way (subject to in bello 
conditions) that involves killing. 
1.1.1 The traditional understanding of liability to attack 
McMahan develops the concept of liability to attack in relation to the concept of 
innocence. He thinks that a person is innocent if that person “has done nothing to make 
himself morally liable to military attack,”21 which entails that a person who is morally 
liable to be attacked is not wronged by being attacked. Walzer understands ‘innocent’ in 
terms of rights, where being innocent means having done nothing that entails the loss of 
rights (to not be attacked, and so on) and McMahan links liability to the loss of this 
right.22 Losing a right is different from cases where rights not to be attacked are waived 
or overridden. McMahan gives the example of a boxing match to illustrate how boxers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 As we shall see in Section 1.3 it could be permissible to fight in a war with the intention of preventing 
atrocities by the just side.  
20 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 5. Emphasis in original. 
21 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 8. Emphasis in original. 
22 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 41; McMahan, Killing in War, p. 9. 
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waive their rights when they consent to be hit as part of the competition.23 It is not correct 
to describe boxers as being liable to attack when they fight, as they have not lost their 
right not to be attacked. Because they have consented to being attacked it is not a 
violation of their rights. Similarly, McMahan tells us, a person’s right not to be attacked 
can also be overridden when there are other morally significant considerations that are 
relevant.24 In instances like this we should say that a person’s rights had been infringed, 
rather than violated, as it was permissible (because of the other moral considerations) to 
act against that person’s right. Attacking a person who is liable to be attacked neither 
violates nor infringes that person’s right as being liable to attack means that she has 
forfeited her right. It is important to note that when a person forfeits her right to life in 
the context of war she only does so under specific circumstances.  
 
A person is only liable to be harmed if harming her is part of the pursuit of a particular 
morally acceptable goal. McMahan identifies two typical aims for which people may be 
liable to attack in warfare: “to prevent the achievement of an unjust cause and to defend 
people from harms that would otherwise be inflicted by unjust combatants in their efforts 
to achieve an unjust cause.”25 This stipulation means that a requirement of necessity 
applies when determining liability. If a proposed harm to a person is not necessary in 
order to achieve a particular goal then that person is not liable to that harm. Likewise, if 
the harm would be excessive or disproportionate in relation to the achievement of the aim 
then the person would not be liable to that harm. McMahan sees both of these 
considerations as internal to the notion of liability. A person cannot be morally liable to 
receive a harm that is unnecessary or disproportionate. To state this in a positive sense: a 
person can only be morally liable to receive a harm that is both necessary and 
proportionate. 
 
The concept of liability to attack has been used to support the moral equality of 
combatants. This is because traditional just war theory (as explicated by Anscombe, 
Nagel, and Walzer) understands the criterion of liability to attack in war simply as posing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 9. 
24 I shall look at an account where these considerations are in play below in Section 1.2.1 when discussing 
why sleeping soldiers are like innocent threats. 
25 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 8. 
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a threat.26 As all combatants pose a threat, they are all morally liable to attack.27 This is 
based on an etymological understanding of ‘innocent’, favoured by just war theorists, 
meaning currently harmless, non-threatening, or non-injurious. Nagel tells us that: “in the 
definition of murder ‘innocent’ means ‘currently harmless,’ and is opposed not to ‘guilty’ 
but to ‘doing harm’.”28 Similarly, Anscombe asserts that innocent means “not harming” 
and the innocent are those “who are not fighting and not engaged in supplying those who 
are with the means of fighting.” 29  The etymological understanding also explains how a 
person can lose their right not to be attacked – simply by threatening another and 
therefore doing them harm. This understanding of innocent is slightly different from the 
general understanding of the word – being not guilty or not culpable. Indeed, Anscombe 
explicitly states that ‘innocent’ in the context of war “is not a term referring to personal 
responsibility at all.”30 The understanding favoured by just war theorists is also the basis 
for the in bello principle of discrimination – combatants must restrict their attacks to 
legitimate targets. Legitimate targets are those who are liable to attack, which under the 
traditional view are the non-innocent combatants on the opposing side - those who pose a 
threat. This line of reasoning has led many just war theorists to substitute the 
discrimination requirement for a principle of noncombatant immunity as they think the 
legitimate/illegitimate target distinction is the same as the combatant/noncombatant 
distinction.31 McMahan’s problem with the mainstream understanding of liability to 
attack as simply posing a threat is that it does not “have any intuitive plausibility at all 
outside the context of war.”32 For the moment I am going to accept this claim because it 
is prima facie implausible that our moral intuitions about the permissibility of violence 
are that different in cases of war when compared to cases of relative peace. It may be the 
case that there are other conditions that affect the permissibility of violence in wartime; I 
will look at these below. Before that I will look at McMahan’s exposition of his claim. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’ in Ethics, Religion and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), pp. 51-61; G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘Mr Truman’s Degree’ in Ethics, Religion and Politics, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 62-71; G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘The Justice of the Present War 
Examined’ in in Ethics, Religion and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 72-81; Thomas 
Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’ in Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 53-74.   
27 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 11. 
28 Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, p. 70. 
29 Anscombe, ‘Mr Truman’s Degree’, p.67. 
30 Anscombe, ‘Mr Truman’s Degree’, p.67. 
31 Hurka, Thomas, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 1, 
2005, pp. 34-66, at p. 36. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Entry on War also identifies 
discrimination and noncombatant immunity as being the same principle: Brian Orend, ‘War’, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/war/ (Accessed March 1, 2014). 
32 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 14. 
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1.1.2 McMahan’s understanding of liability to attack 
McMahan asks us to consider the case of a murderer who is killing innocent people and a 
police officer who takes aim to shoot at the murderer.33 It does not seem right to say that 
in doing this the police officer makes himself liable to be harmed by the murderer. This is 
because the murderer’s actions have made himself liable to the defensive action from the 
police officer. For McMahan a person can have no right of self-defence against a 
threatened harm to which they have made themselves liable. Hobbes would dispute this, 
arguing that people have a natural right to defend themselves against imminent threats.34 
This is a right that is present in the state of nature and one of the few rights Hobbes 
thinks we cannot give up to the sovereign.35 So for Hobbes, even though the police 
officer is an agent of the sovereign with the authority to keep the peace, the murderer 
retains a natural right to defend himself against the officer prosecuting that authority.36 
Few people agree with Hobbes on that point however; a Lockean conception of rights is 
the dominant view. Hobbesian rights are typically thought to be liberty or simple 
freedom rights which have no correlation with duties to others,37 whereas Lockean rights 
are often thought to exist in order to allow us to fulfil our duties to others.38 Because it 
seems that we have duties not to harm others, it is implausible that we retain a right to 
defend ourselves when we are unjustly harming others. Violation of the duty not to harm 
others is one way to lose the right to self-defence. 
 
McMahan uses the example of the murderer as an analogy to show that in cases of war, 
defending the innocent and opposing unjust combatants does not make people liable to 
attack in the same way that the police officer does not make himself liable to attack. 
Combatants fighting on the just side of a conflict maintain their innocence in the more 
general sense mentioned above of not being guilty or culpable. McMahan threatens the 
moral equality of combatants by directly challenging the idea that it is equally morally 
permissible for combatants on different sides to kill each other: “Those who fight solely 
to defend themselves and other innocent people from a wrongful threat of attack, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 14.  
34 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott (ed.), (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), Ch. 14, p. 84.  
35 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 21, p. 142.  
36 I will return to this example in Chapter Two. 
37 For a challenge to this view, see Eleanor Curran, ‘Hobbes’s Theory of Rights: A Modern Interest View’, 
The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2002, pp. 63-86. 
38 See, for example, John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), p. 138. 
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who threaten no one but the wrongful aggressors, do not make themselves morally liable 
to defensive attack.”39  
 
One could accept that this principle applies generally, yet claim that it doesn’t apply in 
war, which is relevantly different. One might argue that it could be the case that morality 
is suspended in war or that the moral principles that apply in war are different.40 It could 
be that an example of a different principle that only applies in war is that merely posing a 
threat is sufficient to be liable to defensive attack. To counter this, McMahan has us 
consider that a group of unjust combatants begin to violate recognised in bello principles 
by attacking and killing innocent civilians.41 In response to this some of the civilians 
manage to gather weapons and defend themselves and other civilians from the unjust 
combatants. This would make them combatants in the moral sense (but not the legal 
sense) if posing a threat to others is sufficient for liability to attack in war. This would 
make them legitimate targets for the unjust combatants. It is clear that this is the wrong 
result. Civilians defending themselves against unjust combatants should not become 
legitimate targets of the unjust combatants in virtue of defending themselves. This is a 
case that is clearly analogous to the murderer that McMahan mentions above. However 
this doesn’t fully solve the problem. Contractarians who defend the moral equality of 
combatants, such as Benbaji, could maintain that there is still a relevant difference 
between moral combatants and legal combatants.42 They could admit that the unjust 
combatants are not permitted to target the armed innocent civilians. They would then say 
that because the innocent civilians became combatants only in the moral sense they fall 
outside of the scope of the Moral Equality of Combatants. Despite its name the moral 
equality of combatants only extends to the equality between legal combatants. This is 
because part of what it takes to be a legal combatant is a necessary condition for the 
symmetry between just and unjust combatants. In particular features such as the training 
that combatants undergo, the understanding of the role of combatants and the tacit 
acceptance (particularly when volunteers) that comes through taking on the role of a 
combatant serve to separate legal combatants from moral combatants. It is because the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 14.  
40 See, for instance, Henry Shue, ‘Do we need a morality of War’, in David Rodin and Henry Shue (eds), 
Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. 87-111. 
41 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 15. 
42 For a more developed contractarian argument for the symmetry thesis, see Yitzhak Benbaji ‘The Moral 
Power of Soldiers to Undertake the Duty of Obedience’, Ethics, Vol. 122, No. 1, 2011, pp. 43-73. 
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civilians do not have this that the unjust combatants are not permitted to kill them, even 
when they take up arms.  
 
McMahan’s arguments above lead him to reject the understanding of ‘innocent’ as 
posing a threat and thus the idea of being liable to attack as simply posing a threat. In 
order to understand being liable to be attacked in relation to being non-innocent 
McMahan needs to develop another understanding of ‘innocent’. Such an alternate 
understanding of ‘innocent’ can be found in some of the earlier just war theorists, 
including Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez.43 Contra Anscombe and Nagel they 
used it to mean ‘not responsible for a wrong’ and it was this that was thought to bestow 
moral immunity from attack. This means that a person may not attack another person in 
war unless that person has committed a wrong. Such an understanding of ‘innocent’ 
enables McMahan to avoid the problems that the murderer example created for the 
traditional understanding. With this understanding the policeman would not be morally 
responsible for a wrong and therefore non-innocent, as doing what he is required to do is 
not committing a wrong. As such he maintains his innocence and is not liable to attack. 
So for McMahan a person is innocent, and therefore not liable to harm, if that person is 
neither morally responsible for, nor guilty of a wrong.44 McMahan’s focus therefore is on 
moral responsibility and moral responsibility for an objectively unjustified threat of 
harm. This is the result McMahan wants as it means that he has a criterion of liability to 
attack that is consistent across cases of war and everyday violence.   
1.2  Benbaji’s Response to McMahan   
I am now going to pose a problem for McMahan’s account based on Yitzhak Benbaji’s 
‘Sleeping Soldiers’ example. The example is quite detailed, so I quote it here in full: 
 
“A war has been initiated by an unjust aggression carried out by an elite (and very small) unit 
of unjust combatants. The preparations for the military campaign were highly confidential. 
Very few unjust combatants were aware of them. Now, immediately after the surprise attack 
had been launched, just combatants responded by attacking sleeping enemy soldiers. At the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 For an excellent paper that details how Walzer’s developments run contrary to the history of just war 
theory, see Gregory Reichberg, ‘Just War and Regular War: Competing Paradigms’, in David Rodin and 
Henry Shue (eds), Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008)pp. 193-213. 
44 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 34.  
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time the sleeping soldiers joined the army it was permissible to do so. Additionally, they 
contributed nothing to the unjust attack, knew nothing about it in advance, and are not 
responsible for the aggression initiated by their country in any other way. Even so, 
presumably they will participate in the war. So, their killing is preventive and, as such, a 
means for achieving a legitimate military goal.”45 
 
I agree with Benbaji that the intuition that the attack on the sleeping soldiers is permitted 
is very clear.46 War has begun and it seems to be common sense the counterattack against 
what are now unjust combatants is justified. Based on this, Benbaji thinks that this 
example raises two problems for McMahan that I will discuss in turn.  
 
The first is that it seems that the sleeping soldiers have prima facie not done anything that 
makes them liable to attack. Because they cannot be morally responsible for the threat of 
harm they pose (recall that joining the military was permissible - they have done nothing 
wrong), McMahan’s analysis seems to render the result that they are not liable to attack 
despite being unjust combatants. I will discuss this issue with reference to innocent 
threats. The second problem is also counterintuitive: If McMahan does argue that the 
sleeping soldiers are liable to attack then, being unjust combatants, they are denied the 
right of self-defence. This is “despite the fact that their membership in the military forces 
is permissible, they are not yet the agents of any threat, and they have had no chance to 
opt out from the unjust war.”47  
1.2.1  Why the sleeping soldiers are like innocent threats and able to be 
attacked 
As mentioned above, the first problem for McMahan is due to the fact that the sleeping 
soldiers have not done anything that makes them liable to attack. It is due to the agency 
of others, namely the government and the elite unit, that they have become unjust 
combatants. In this sense they are analogous to innocent threats. As we shall see, this is a 
problem for McMahan as he does not think that it is permissible to attack innocent threats 
in self-defence precisely because they are not responsible for the threat they pose.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Yitzhak Benbaji, ‘A Defense of the Traditional War Convention’, Ethics, Vol. 118, No. 3, 2008, pp. 464-
495, at p. 471. 
46 Benbaji, ‘A Defense of the Traditional War Convention’, p. 473. 
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The problem of an ‘innocent threat’ was first identified by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, 
State, and, Utopia and deliberately “tiptoe[d] around”.48 Nozick defines an innocent 
threat as “someone who innocently is a causal agent in a process such that he would be 
an aggressor had he chosen to become such an agent.”49 An example of this type of case 
is this: A man is pushed by a villain so as to fall onto another man. Falling onto the 
victim would kill the victim. The only way for the victim to defend himself is to shoot 
the falling man which would result in the death of the falling man. The falling man is 
innocent because he was pushed, but he could have been non-innocent if he had 
deliberately jumped. Nozick does not offer an answer to the question of who is permitted 
to use force against who in cases like these, merely noting that innocent threats stand 
apart from regular innocent people (against whom violence is usually prohibited) with 
different principles applying.50 Nozick’s use of ‘innocent’ here aligns with McMahan’s 
use in the sense that it refers to the fact that the falling man is wholly non-responsible for 
the threat that he poses. 
 
The main reason why McMahan thinks it is impermissible to kill the falling man in self-
defence is because there are no relevant differences between innocent threats and 
innocent bystanders.51 It is thought to be generally impermissible to kill an innocent 
bystander in self-defence (perhaps through using them as a human shield); consistency 
demands that it is also impermissible to kill an innocent threat in self-defence.52 It is of 
course true that the bystander is not a part of the threat, yet McMahan has already shown 
that posing a threat is not sufficient for liability, and this difference is just a relative fact 
about “position[s] in the local causal architecture” and cannot result in the right not to be 
killed to be forfeit.53 This analysis is problematic for McMahan because when applied to 
the sleeping soldiers it entails that they are not liable to be attacked as they are innocent 
threats. This conflicts with our common-sense intuition that the just combatants should 
be able to attack the sleeping soldiers.  
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I think that it can be argued that it is permissible to attack the sleeping soldiers. This is 
done through identifying a relevant difference between innocent bystanders and innocent 
threats. Helen Frowe and Jonathan Quong both argue that the difference between 
innocent threats and innocent bystanders has to do with how the victim relates to them 
and the threat of harm.54 Frowe identifies the moral abhorrence of killing the bystander as 
lying in the fact that when we kill a bystander in order to defend ourselves, we use them 
in a morally reprehensible way. Using people in this way is clearly impermissible (it is 
analogous to harvesting an innocent’s organs for your own survival55) and if there is no 
relevant difference between innocent bystanders and innocent threats, and if it is 
impermissible to use bystanders as a means then it is also impermissible to use the threats 
as means. Frowe rejects this implication by identifying a difference between killing a 
person (innocent bystander) as a means to the end of self-preservation and killing a 
person (innocent threat) as a means to self-preservation.56 It is impossible to use the 
innocent threat as means to self-preservation because it is their killing which is 
instrumental to the victim’s end. As Frowe says: “Falling person is the threat, and thus 
cannot also be an instrument in the process of eliminating the threat.”57 Quong draws 
similar attention to the nature of the innocent threat as the threat. He says that “in killing 
the Innocent Threat you do not exploit their presence as a means of doing something you 
could not do without them, but this is what you do in the Bystander cases.”58  
 
McMahan rejects this suggestion because he thinks that there are cases where the 
presence of Innocent Bystanders is not exploited as a means to avoid an Innocent Threat 
yet they are still killed.59 For McMahan this is impermissible. A case that illustrates this 
involves one running through the woods in order to escape a Culpable Threat.60 The only 
way for Victim to escape is to cross a narrow, wobbly bridge. Unfortunately getting onto 
the bridge would cause the Innocent Bystander to be shaken off and plummet to her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Helen Frowe, ‘Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 
4, 2008, pp. 277-290; Jonathan Quong, ‘Killing in Self-Defense’, Ethics, Vol. 119, No. 3,  2009, pp. 507-
537. 
55 Otsuka, ‘Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense’, p. 87. 
56 Frowe, ‘Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders’, p. 280. 
57 Frowe, ‘Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders’, p. 280.                     
58 Quong, ‘Killing in Self-Defense’, p. 526. 
59 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 171. 
60 Variations of this case appear in both McMahan, Killing in War KIW, p. 171, and Quong, ‘Killing in 
Self-Defense’, p. 531. 
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death. It is not possible for the bystander to get off the bridge in time for Victim to get on 
and escape the Threat. McMahan suggests that running onto, or shaking the bridge in 
order to dislodge the Bystander, would be examples of killing as a means of self-
preservation, as you are not exploiting their presence by doing something you could not 
do without them.61 Because there is no difference between the way you kill the Innocent 
Bystander in this case and the way that Innocent Threats were killed above it seems that 
the relevant difference identified by Frowe and Quong does not apply. Fortunately there 
is still a way to identify the relevant difference in a way that recognises the 
impermissibility of killing the Innocent Bystander on the bridge.62 Quong argues that 
people have a prima facie claim to the space they occupy, provided it is not someone 
else’s private property.63 Quong identifies this intuition as being motivated by the similar 
claim that “people have presumptive claim-rights over their body”.64 Without rights over 
their body or the space that their body occupies people would lack the most basic 
requirements for human agency. This is because without such rights we would not be 
able to limit others using our body for their own purposes, essentially becoming tools of 
others. This consideration allows us to determine that running onto, or shaking the bridge 
in order to dislodge the Innocent Bystander is impermissible because Victim would 
violate the claim that the Innocent Bystander has to the space they occupy on the bridge. 
This is despite the fact that the Bystander is not occupying the whole bridge, for the 
precarious nature of the bridge is such that it makes sense to treat it as a piece of space 
that can only accommodate one person at a time. So despite McMahan’s objections 
otherwise, the distinction of Frowe and Quong do not entail that it is permissible to run 
onto the bridge. This qualification allows Quong to propose the following counterfactual 
as a means of determining whether the killing of an innocent person, X, would be 
permissible: “if X and all the things currently belonging to X were suddenly to disappear, 
would your life be saved?”65 It is plausible to think of the things that X has a claim right 
to as belonging to X. If the answer to the question is yes, then you do not exploit X by 
killing them, as you keep what you would have, namely your life, without them. But if 
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the answer is no, then you do exploit X, as you cannot survive without the presence of 
them or things over which they have a rightful claim. As Quong says, you would be 
shifting “the harm of death from yourself onto X by using X’s entitlements against 
them.”66 As this would be using X as a means to your own survival it would be 
impermissible. 
 
McMahan would be concerned by this result, because it runs contrary to his account of 
liability to attack, which states that one must be morally responsible for an unjust threat. 
However I do not think he needs to be too concerned. This is because it is possible for 
him to take the position that Nozick suggests in that different principles of self-defence 
apply to innocent threats. So McMahan could maintain his account of liability to attack 
as applying to all those who are non-innocent, and accept that a different account, which 
sits parallel to his own, applies to those threats who are innocent. That different account 
could be expressed by Quong’s counterfactual question, or it might require further 
development. I do not have the space here to fully discuss alternate accounts for the 
permissibility of killing innocent threats; however it is sufficient to point out that such an 
account does not in of itself threaten McMahan’s overall account of liability to attack.67  
 
This solves the first problem Benbaji poses with the sleeping soldiers example because if 
the sleeping soldiers are innocent threats then it would be permissible for the just 
combatants to attack them, as they would not be using them as a means to ensure their 
own survival. The addition of an extra condition pertaining to innocent threats to 
McMahan’s account engenders an analysis that is consistent with the common-sense 
intuition that it is permissible for the just combatants to attack the sleeping soldiers.  
1.2.2 Why the sleeping soldiers are permitted to defend themselves 
I think that the analysis employed when solving the first problem enables us to solve the 
second problem too. Recall that the second problem consists of accepting that if it is 
permissible to attack the sleeping soldiers, which I have argued it is, then it seems that 
McMahan’s analysis would deny them the right to defend themselves, despite their 
innocence. Solving the problem means showing why they would be permitted to defend 
themselves. 
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Benbaji argues that in innocent threat cases both the victim and the threat are permitted to 
defend themselves by attacking and killing the other. This is because Benbaji thinks that 
both the victim and the falling man “lose their right not to be attacked but retain their 
right to self-defense.”68 Benbaji here identifies that in cases of self-defence we possess 
two rights. There is the claim-right that we have against others not to be killed and there 
is the liberty-right we possess that allows us to act in self-defence. So Benbaji is saying 
that in Innocent Threat cases where neither party is responsible for the harm that will be 
committed, and is thereby innocent, then the situation is one of moral equality. Each 
party loses their claim-right but both retain their liberty-right. This analysis is also 
supported by Quong.69 I agree with the conclusion but disagree with the specifics of the 
analysis. It is not correct to say that each party loses their claim-right not to be killed by 
the other because neither of them have done anything to waive or forfeit that right. 
Instead it is correct to say that conditions are such that it is permissible for each to 
override the claim-right of the other. This is consistent with McMahan’s account of 
liability to attack that was outlined above. One set of morally significant conditions that 
are required for rights to be overridden (rather than violated) is the inevitable prospect of 
an indivisible harm for which neither party are responsible for. The harm is indivisible 
because it cannot be shared. If it were the case that a collision between an innocent threat 
and a victim would result in both being bruised then that would be the fair result. 
However in most innocent threat cases it is stipulated that someone will die. Death is an 
indivisible harm that cannot be shared in the way that bruises can; one person has to 
suffer all of the harm. So the correct analysis of the situation is that both parties retain 
their right to self-defence yet it is permissible for their claim-right to not be attacked to 
be infringed by the other party.  
 
The next issue is how the solutions to the problems raised by sleeping soldiers bears on 
the independence and the symmetry theses.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Benbaji, ‘A Defense of the Traditional War Convention’, p. 477.   
69 Quong, ‘Killing in Self-Defense’, pp. 520-22. 
26	  
	  
1.2.3 Implications of sleeping soldiers for the independence and 
symmetry theses 
Benbaji thinks that the sleeping soldiers case demonstrates a moral equality of 
combatants, thereby asserting the symmetry thesis.70 This is correct, to the extent that in 
the example both sides are permitted to use defensive force against the other side. Yet 
this is only going to be problematic for McMahan if wars typically generate situations 
like sleeping soldiers, because if this is the case it will result in his analysis being 
generally irrelevant. So the question becomes: how often in war it is the case that the 
soldiers on the unjust side are innocent threats, analogous to the example of the sleeping 
soldiers. Following Walzer, Benbaji asserts the independence principle and argues that 
that responsibility lies with the leader of the political community.71 Because the 
responsibility lies elsewhere the unjust combatants “are not the agents of the threat they 
pose, so they are not culpable for it.”72 Further, Benbaji claims that this helps explain 
why the killings of unjust combatants in an aggressive war are defensive, and therefore 
permissible.73 This is because of the nature of the situation immediately prior to a war. At 
that moment, combatants on both sides threaten each other: “And since at least some 
unjust combatants are not even minimally culpable for the initial threat they pose, the 
defensive threat posed to them is also unjust.”74 Those unjust combatants are, according 
to Benbaji, permitted to eliminate this threat, despite losing the right not to be attacked 
through posing an unjust threat themselves. 
 
Unfortunately for Benbaji his account here has at least two flaws. The first flaw is that he 
relies too heavily on the independence thesis drawing responsibility away from the 
soldiers. Whilst it is true sleeping soldiers lack any responsibility for the unjust threat 
they pose, this is not the case generally. In sleeping soldiers and the innocent threat 
examples there was no way that the threat could be plausibly attributed to the agency of 
the threateners. This does not generally apply in war, as most soldiers have some control 
over their actions. It is true that they are subject to military discipline and perhaps other 
forms of coercion, but at best this will give them a partial excuse (partial because they 
retain some control) for the threat that they pose. It will not result in the clean moral 
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equality between innocent threats and innocent victims that is required for each to be 
permitted to attack the other. Benbaji cannot stipulate responsibility away when it is the 
very thing we are trying to determine. So whilst it is probably true that unjust combatants 
are not fully responsible for the threat they pose, they are not innocent in the sense 
highlighted by sleeping soldiers.  
 
The second flaw with his account is that he fails to distinguish between potential and 
actual threats. It is trivially true that combatants on both sides potentially threaten each 
other. When ordinary people walk past each other in the street they potentially threaten 
each other, though the probability of the threat being actualised in these cases is much 
lower. It is not permissible to invoke this potentiality as a justification for defensive 
action in the future.75 This justification is particularly problematic when used by a party 
to justify subsequent attacks after they had instigated the conflict with aggressive action.  
So Benbaji’s attempt to show how the moral equality present in sleeping soldiers 
generalises does not succeed. 
 
There is one concerning implication that sleeping soldiers raises however. If the sleeping 
soldiers didn’t find out that it was actually their side who unjustly initiated the war then it 
is easy to see that they would think they are permitted to keep on fighting. They would 
(incorrectly) see themselves as being the just combatants having suffered an unjust attack 
whilst they were sleeping. In this instance it seems that they are very much like innocent 
threats as they are being manipulated by their commanders. The commanders are like the 
villainous pusher in the innocent threat case in that they are manipulating innocent people 
into being unjustified threats. The villainous man pusher uses facts about Falling Man, 
such as his weight, in order to fulfil his unjust aims. Similarly the commanders use facts 
about the men, mainly their willingness to fight against an unjust threat, in order to 
pursue their own unjust aims. But this is only problematic if the aim of just war theory is 
to mitigate the harm of war as such an incentive will serve to perpetuate harm through 
incentivising epistemic deceit. McMahan, with his focus on identifying morally 
permissible defensive action would not change the theory to mitigate the bad outcomes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The exception here is a preventive action which relies on a high probability of the potential threat 
occurring in order to be permissible. 
28	  
	  
1.3  Why unjust combatants are unable to satisfy the 
discrimination requirement 
I will now change focus slightly and look at the implications of McMahan’s arguments 
for the symmetry thesis. I particular I will look at how unjust combatants are able to 
satisfy the in bello principle of discrimination. McMahan thinks that his arguments that 
show why the traditional understanding of the criterion of liability to attack is mistaken 
also prevent unjust combatants from meeting the principle of discrimination, which he 
identifies as the central principle of jus in bello. This is problematic for the moral 
equality of combatants as the in bello principles are supposed to be neutral between just 
and unjust combatants. The traditional view of Just War Theory holds that once a war has 
started, meeting the in bello conditions should not be more difficult for unjust 
combatants. McMahan argues that this is mistaken and unjust combatants are (nearly 
always) unable to satisfy the principle of discrimination.  
 
The reason that unjust combatants fail to satisfy the principle of discrimination is because 
they lack legitimate targets. The traditional understanding of the discrimination 
requirement identifies only noncombatants as illegitimate targets. This is because 
noncombatants are thought to be innocent in the sense that they are non-threatening. 
McMahan’s position has the implication that just combatants are not legitimate targets, 
because people do not forfeit their right against attack and become legitimate targets 
“simply by offering violent resistance to unjust attacks by unjust combatants.”76 
McMahan thinks that in the same way that the police officer maintains his innocence, just 
combatants also maintain theirs. This means that as they innocent they are not legitimate 
targets and attacking them, as unjust combatants are wont to do in a war, would thereby 
violate the principle of discrimination.  
 
McMahan does not think that just combatants are incapable of becoming legitimate 
targets. He identifies one example when it is permissible for unjust combatants to 
intentionally target just combatants: when just combatants pursue their legitimate aims 
through impermissible means.77 One example of this would be through intentionally 
attacking innocent people as we saw in the bombing campaign conducted by the Allies 
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near the end of World War II. These impermissible actions made the pilots at least 
morally liable to defensive attack as they became “legitimate targets even for unjust 
combatants.”78 An analogous case might be if the policeman in the murderer case fired 
intentionally at innocent people who had come in between the policeman and the 
murderer. The policeman has the legitimate aim of targeting the murderer but if he 
targets innocents in pursuit of this aim then he makes himself liable to be harmed. Whilst 
it is important to note this exception, in the overall context of assessing the permissibility 
of killing in war it is of negligible importance as an unjust war cannot predominantly 
consist of acts that work to prevent wrongful acts of war by combatants.79 This is because 
prosecuting a war would have to involve acts that are not reactionary. It is difficult to 
imagine how a war could progress by only preventing unjust acts by just combatants. 
Advancing an unjust cause would have to involve acts that are not merely responses to 
the acts of the enemy. For instance it seems that it would be difficult for the Axis to have 
restricted their war against the Allies to simply stopping their unjust bombings of cities. 
This is especially so because a war like this would primarily be a war of self-defence (i.e. 
defending their own civilians) and an unjust war, which is typically aggressive, is not 
going to primarily consist of defensive acts. The fact that unjust combatants are generally 
going to be unable to satisfy the in bello principle of discrimination shows that the 
symmetry thesis is false as it highlights that a proper understanding of liability to attack 
results in just and unjust combatants having different in bello rights and obligations. The 
fact that these differences are a result of the unjust combatants advancing an unjust aim, 
an ad bellum consideration, shows that the independence thesis is false as it demonstrates 
that in bello judgements are influenced by ad bellum considerations. Because the two 
theses that constitute the moral equality of combatants are false, it should be rejected.  
1.4  Hurka’s Response to McMahan 
Thomas Hurka is in agreement with McMahan regarding his analysis of the murderer 
case and its application to war.80 So he thinks that simply posing a threat is not sufficient 
for a person to be morally liable to attack. But Hurka does not think that this is the most 
persuasive justification of the moral equality of combatants. He thinks that volunteer 
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armies provide a better justification. This is because through “voluntarily entering 
military service, soldiers on both sides freely took on the status of soldiers and thereby 
freely accepted that they may permissibly be killed in the course of war.”81 Hurka thinks 
that the situation of combatants is very similar to that of boxers who waive their rights to 
be permissibly attacked by specific people - the opposing fighter. Combatants accept the 
permissibility of being killed by enemy combatants in the course of a battle. Part of this 
acceptance involves the condition that the enemy combatants accept the reciprocal 
permissibility that they may be killed also. An important feature of the combatant’s 
waiver is that it, according to Hurka, is done with no regard to the justice of either sides 
cause.82 This has the important implication that their moral status with respect to each 
other is the same; they waived their rights and became combatants equally. Hurka 
highlights what he takes to be one important difference to the Boxer example in that 
combatants give up their right globally. Whereas boxers give up their rights in very 
specific, limited circumstances, combatants give up their rights in all future wars. I think 
that this difference is only a matter of scale. A combatant also gives up his rights in very 
specific, limited circumstances - in the theatre of war as opposed to everyday life. It is 
also not entirely global as combatants retire, as do boxers. They both get their rights back 
then. The difference is actually slightly different to what Hurka identifies. He says that 
the combatant waives the right not to be harmed. But the combatant actually abnegates 
the right to determine when to fight. He gives up the autonomy to choose which wars he 
fights in. This is something that the boxer does not do when he decides to fight. Now the 
person who is a combatant can regain this autonomy to choose when he fights, but only 
by quitting and not fighting in a war. This would thereby make the person no longer a 
combatant, as part of what it means to be a combatant (a volunteer one at least) is that the 
decision as to which wars they take part in is not up to them.83 This is made more 
explicit, as Hurka points out, when we see that combatants who refuse to fight in a war 
can be prosecuted for desertion. I am assuming that combatants who resign before being 
deployed will not be prosecuted for desertion, even though they might face other costs.  
 
Hurka considers a serious objection to his view which says that in many cases people 
become combatants in a way that is not fully voluntary, either through conscription or 
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having no other career options: “How can these soldiers have voluntarily surrendered 
their right if their joining the military was forced?”84 Hurka identifies two responses to 
this. First is the ‘hard-line’ response which says that in all of these cases there is an 
element of choice, such as the choice to go to prison in protest, or leave the country, 
which entails that entering the military is still voluntary. Even this limited level of 
voluntary choice is sufficient, so the hard-line response says, “to involve a full surrender 
of rights.”85 In contrast, the ‘soft-line’ response accounts for differential status of 
combatants. For combatants who are forced into joining the military the soft-line view 
can give greater weight to their potential deaths when entering into proportionality 
calculations. Further to this, when it comes to assessing the extent to which conscripts 
have given up their rights, the soft-line view can say that whilst volunteer combatants are 
able to permissibly be attacked at any stage of a war, conscripted combatants are only 
able to be when they are a “sufficiently imminent threat.”86 A sufficiently imminent 
threat in this context means that the conscripted combatants have the status of innocent 
threats. The implication of this is that the only time they are liable to attack is when they 
are engaged in actual fighting. Conscripted combatants would not be liable to attack 
when sleeping in their barracks and otherwise disengaged from combat.  
 
Hurka ultimately refrains from choosing between the hard-line and soft-line views, but I 
don’t think either view provides a successful defence of the waiver account. This is 
because I don’t think that the moral responsibility for your actions can be fully abnegated. 
Whilst it is true that we can relinquish decision making, it is not so obvious that we can 
relinquish responsibility. Denying responsibility for a voluntary action would deny an 
essential part of what it means to be a person. Further, it is not clear that the analogy with 
the boxer holds up. When two boxers step into the ring they each know that the other has 
waived their right. This is not necessarily the case in war, especially when we consider 
that many of the actual motivations for people joining an army are directly related to ad 
bellum considerations. If people feel their country is fighting an unjust threat, this can be 
sufficient to motivate them to fight. And if the reason for their joining the army is based 
on an assessment of ad bellum principles it is incorrect to say that they give up the right 
to decide those matters when they join; their ad bellum conclusions were what led them 
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to fight in the first place. To spell it out clearly: if civilians join the army because they 
wish to prevent the enemy unjustly invading their country it is clear that they do not 
consent to being attacked by the enemy. The reason they joined the army was to prevent 
the enemy threatening them, not the complete opposite! So for these reasons I think that 
Hurka’s response to McMahan does not succeed in establishing the moral equality of 
combatants. 
1.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced and examined both the moral equality of combatants and 
McMahan’s criticisms of it. I have argued that McMahan shows that the traditional 
conception of liability to attack – posing a threat – is inadequate. I have also argued in 
response to Benbaji that McMahan’s account should be modified in order to be able to 
account for innocent threats. Understanding McMahan’s account of liability to attack 
enabled me to outline why unjust combatants are unable to satisfy the in bello 
requirement of discrimination. This discussion demonstrated why the independence and 
symmetry theses are false and subsequently that the moral equality of combatants is to be 
rejected. Finally I looked at Hurka’s response to McMahan and argued that it failed. In 
the next chapter I will look at McMahan’s contribution to the development of the 









2.  Proportionality 
McMahan’s revisionist criticisms of just war theory lead him to significantly modify the 
jus in bello requirement of proportionality. In this chapter I will look at McMahan’s 
developments in the context of prior modifications by Thomas Hurka, and a subsequent 
critique by David Rodin. Traditionally this requirement of proportionality has said that 
combatants may only use force that is proportional to the end that they seek. McMahan 
argues that determining proportionality requires the evaluation of more factors (such as 
liability and intention) than simply measuring the amount of harm against the good 
achieved. His revisions come after his rejection of the moral equality of combatants, 
which leads him to argue that unjust combatants also have difficulty satisfying the 
proportionality condition. This is because as unjust combatants they will typically be 
advancing unjust aims that will be difficult to justify. My discussion will first set out the 
traditional understanding of proportionality, before moving on in the second section to 
discuss Hurka’s widely accepted revision that clarifies the goods and evils taken into 
account. The third section will look at McMahan’s account. The fourth section will 
explore Rodin’s critique of McMahan where I will argue that his incorporation of 
significantly many more factors in the proportionality calculation is closer to the correct 
view. Finally I will consider a general problem for both McMahan and Rodin’s revisions 
of proportionality.  
2.1  The Traditional Understanding of Proportionality 
Just war theory has traditionally distinguished between an ad bellum and an in bello 
proportionality requirement. The ad bellum requirement holds that resort to war is 
impermissible if the relevant good effects of the war are outweighed by the bad effects.87 
An example of a war that might not be proportional would be one that would be 
predicted to be a gruelling war of attrition with high rates of innocent casualties on both 
sides over a disputed patch of worthless territory.88 The in bello requirement makes 
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similar claims about individual acts in a war. Henry Sidgwick explains that it is 
impermissible to do “any mischief which does not tend materially to the end [of victory], 
nor any mischief of which the conduciveness towards the end is slight in comparison 
with the amount of mischief.”89 This is supposed to prohibit excess (or disproportional) 
harm through appealing to two criteria. The first is the criterion of necessity, which many 
authors think is a separate in bello principle. Hurka tells us that “killing soldiers and 
especially civilians is forbidden if it serves no military purpose”.90 So even though unjust 
combatants are liable to harm, if harming them does not further the aim of the war then 
that harm is not permissible. The second criterion is a more explicit proportionality 
requirement. According to Sidgwick we are required to weigh the mischief done against 
its contribution towards winning the war. It is pertinent to note that it is only the 
contribution to the military advantage which is assessed here, not the ultimate purpose of 
the military action. An important issue in interpreting this criterion is determining who 
counts when weighing up mischief, as traditionally not everyone has.  
 
Both ad bellum and in bello cases assume that the principle of discrimination (whereby it 
is only permissible to attack legitimate targets, i.e. combatants in the traditional 
understanding) is already applicable and so “the relevant bad effects are generally only 
assumed to include only unintentional harms to the innocent” as intentional harms to the 
innocent are already ruled out.91 Similarly, harms to those who are liable to suffer them 
have traditionally played no role in proportionality requirements. An implication of this 
last point is highlighted by Hurka: if justified combatants can prevent an attack by 
unjustified combatants that would kill only one civilian on the side of the justified 
combatants, then they are permitted to “kill virtually any number of any soldiers” in 
order to save the one civilian.92 It is not clear if this proportionality result, when the 
deaths of only one or two civilians are anticipated, would apply to ad bellum 
deliberations around starting a war. The reason for this is that it is uncertain that 
opposition combatants count as being liable to attack prior to the war beginning. If they 
do not count as liable to attack then it seems that their predicted deaths would weigh 
against military action, but if they do count then their predicted deaths would not enter 
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calculations and military action would be more likely.  However it does seem clear that 
under the traditional view, once the war has begun enemy combatants are committed to 
being morally liable to attack and so they play no role in proportionality deliberations.93 
This means that those who do weigh in proportionality calculations are citizens and 
combatants on your side and any potentially foreseen but unintended harm to enemy (and 
neutral) noncombatants.94 Walzer gives the example of General Roberts who, during the 
battle of Paardeberg in the Boer War, called off assaults on Boer trenches, saying that the 
casualties “did not appear … to be warranted by the exigencies of the situation.”95 His 
main consideration was the lives of the soldiers under his command, not enemy soldiers.  
2.2  Hurka’s Account of Proportionality 
Hurka sees both the ad bellum and in bello proportionality requirements as saying that a 
war or an act in a war is wrong “if the relevant harm it will cause is out of proportion to 
its relevant good.”96 The questions for Hurka then become: what are the relevant goods 
and evils that count in a proportionality requirement?97 Hurka does not think that it is 
plausible to weigh the goods and evils equally such that a war is proportionate if the total 
good of the war outweighs the total evil, as James Turner Johnson advocates.98 It is 
similarly implausible for Hurka if the goods are weighed more heavily than the evils, 
such that a war can be proportionate even if it causes more harm than good, as the US 
Catholic Bishops and Douglas Lackey argue.99 The main problem that Hurka sees with 
both these views is that they count in their calculations all the goods that a war will 
produce. As an example, Hurka asks us to imagine a war that is fought with a just cause 
where one of the good outcomes will be lifting the nation out of recession. Despite the 
very real economic benefits of a war (World War II effectively ended the depression of 
the 1930s) it does not seem appropriate that these benefits count towards the justification 
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of war.100 Similarly, other benefits that can come from war, such as technological 
advancement or the satisfaction of desires of soldiers, do not seem relevant to 
proportionality. Hurka proposes a restriction on the goods that count towards 
proportionality - “the relevant goods are only those contained in the just causes.”101 It is 
only the goods that come from achieving the just aims of a war that count towards its 
proportionality. According to Hurka this stipulation frees us from a problem with 
Johnson’s account in that it does not require that a war have overall good effects. So a 
war would not be disproportionate if the money a war cost could have been spent 
alleviating poverty in another part of the world, but it would be disproportionate if there 
was a less destructive way to achieve the war aim.102 In his formulation Hurka draws on 
McMahan and Robert McKim in distinguishing between sufficient and contributing just 
causes.103 The existence of a sufficient just cause satisfies the just cause condition by 
itself. Examples of these include the standard just causes: resisting aggression, the 
prevention of major humanitarian atrocities, and so on. In contrast to sufficient just 
causes, contributing just causes do not by themselves fulfill the just cause requirement. It 
is only when there is a sufficient just cause that contributing causes come into play. So 
whilst a contributing just cause might be the disarmament of an enemy, a nation can only 
pursue this if there is a sufficient just cause that enables it. On its own the contributing 
cause cannot justify military action. Hurka asks whether there is some contributing 
feature that allows us to identify a contributing just cause. He cannot identify any, 
allowing that “like the sufficient just causes, they are just the items on a list,”104 and that 
the limits are only intuitive ones.   
 
Hurka’s analysis of in bello proportionality draws on his arguments regarding ad bellum 
proportionality. When justifying a particular act in a war we must look at whether it 
contributes to the just causes, either sufficient or contributing, through increasing their 
likelihood or degree of achievement.105 As in the ad bellum case, acts leading to the 
satisfaction of a contributing just cause will only be permissible if that cause is relevant 
through being enabled by a sufficient just cause. Hurka sees the in bello proportionality 
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requirement as taking into account another consideration, namely the relevant good of an 
act contributing to reducing the cost of achieving a war’s just causes.106 As an example of 
this Hurka considers an act that will foreseeably result in the deaths of more civilians 
when compared with another that will reduce either the economic costs of the act or the 
number of military casualties. Sometimes it will be required to accept the greater cost to 
prevent the deaths of enemy civilians, but Hurka argues that this consideration is not 
unlimited: “we cannot be required to sacrifice hundreds of soldiers or spend billions of 
dollars to save a few enemy civilians.”107 I shall argue in Chapter Four that some 
civilians will be responsible for the war in a way that makes them liable to attack. If this 
is correct then greater costs will not be required to protect enemy civilians. Hurka also 
realises that his arguments run counter to traditional just war theory. In requiring in bello 
proportionality to be sensitive to ad bellum proportionality he is rejecting the 
independence of the ad bellum and in bello principles. He also thinks that the varying 
moral importance of the just cause influences in bello permissibility. So a war of extreme 
moral imperative such as that against Nazi Germany will permit a greater level of 
destruction than say the Falklands War, even though both wars would be justified.108 This 
leads Hurka to the conclusion that soldiers fighting to advance an unjust cause can never 
act permissibly as they will never satisfy the in bello proportionality requirement. It 
should be noted that Hurka does not think that they should be punished as “soldiers 
normally cannot be expected to evaluate their nations’ war aims, they are not to blame 
for acting wrongly.”109 
 
When Hurka turns to determining the relevant evils applicable to proportionality, he finds 
no restriction on their content that is parallel to the restriction on relevant goods. So, the 
fact that a war will benefit the economy does not count in its favour, but the fact that it 
harms the economy “surely counts against it.”110 Similarly hindering scientific 
development, or the pain of combatants who fight counts against a war. Therefore, when 
assessing the proportionality of a war “we count evils of all the kinds it will cause, with 
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no limits on their content.”111 There is a worry that this view allows for a proliferation of 
evils to be considered which includes things that no political leader would consider in a 
proportionality calculation simply because they do not seem to be relevant. For instance 
in a later paper, Hurka mentions that a relevant evil would be the hindrance or 
destruction of art.112 In a proportionality calculation where we are weighing up the goods 
and evils of a war the goods that are most likely in play are those that come from 
satisfying the just cause(s). It just does not seem right to say that things like destruction 
of art, or scientific research, count towards determining proportionality in the same way 
as the satisfaction of a just cause or the prospect of human atrocities. 
 
Hurka also attempts to answer the question of responsibility for third party evils.  Hurka 
claims that just as with relevant goods, the temporal or causal remoteness of a relevant 
evil to either a war or an act does not seem to be relevant.113 The fact that evil in the 
future will occur as a direct result of my action, for example through a war increasing 
instability in a region, or predictably resulting in conflict between other third parties, 
does not mean that it does not weigh in our proportionality requirements. However what 
does seem to reduce the weight of the above mentioned evil in a proportionality 
requirement is when the responsibility for the harm seems to lie with another agent. 
Hurka considers a case where an agent’s defence against an attacker will lead to 
increased attacks on others, maybe because the attacker will vent his rage on weaker 
victims.114 The responsibility for the resulting attacks, though they would not have 
occurred without the agent’s defence, surely lies with the attacker and not with the agent. 
It is extremely implausible that we could be held responsible for the independent actions 
of another.115 The fact that the responsibility for the evil lies elsewhere minimises the 
weight that the evil has in a proportionality calculation. However Hurka refuses to 
commit to whether or not the wrongful choices of others can reduce our responsibility for 
bad outcomes. Rather he notes that there is a range of views ranging from another’s 
wrong choice removing our responsibility for an action (thereby giving it zero weight in 
a proportionality calculation), to the agency of others having no relevance whatsoever to 
the weight an evil has in our proportionality calculations (thereby giving it full 
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weight).116  There are also intermediate views where evils that depend on others agency 
only diminish the weight of an evil, or only diminish the evil in some cases and not 
others - say when the choice is made by the person who will suffer the evil.117  
2.3  McMahan’s Account of Proportionality 
In contrast to Hurka, McMahan has a more nuanced understanding of the proportionality 
requirements that enables him to develop a more comprehensive analysis of 
proportionality justifications.118 He is in agreement with Sidgwick as to the function of 
the proportionality requirement: “Proportionality is a constraint on action that causes 
harm.”119 Typically, for an act that causes harm to be justified it must be instrumental to 
the achievement of some goal against which the harm can be compared. McMahan labels 
the goal of an act of war a ‘war aim’. The main difference between Hurka and McMahan 
is that McMahan thinks there is more to proportionality calculations than simply 
weighing the harms and benefits of an action against the war aim. In particular he 
emphasises the importance of liability and intention as two factors that affect how we 
understand different types of proportionality requirements regarding harm.120 With these 
factors in play McMahan is able to identify four different proportionality requirements 
with reference to four different types of acts:121 
 
i.  Acts that intentionally harm those who are potentially liable to be harmed in the 
pursuit of some war aim. 
ii.  Acts that unintentionally but foreseeably harm those who are potentially liable. 
iii.  Acts that intentionally harm those who are not potentially liable. 
iv.  Acts that unintentionally but foreseeably harm those who are not potentially 
liable.  
 
This account is innovative because it outlines factors that are important to consider when 
determining if a harm is proportionate. The introduction of these new factors also makes 
it an improvement because it allows us to more accurately understand proportionality. It 
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introduces features that are important to justifications of harm that are not captured 
through simply weighing up the harm. When philosophers discuss proportionality in war 
they typically consider cases that are linked with the fourth kind – weighing unintended 
harms against noncombatants with the war goals an act would further. This is contrasted 
with the first kind of proportionality which is that usually discussed when considering 
cases of self-defence. McMahan considers an actual case of individual self-defence to 
draw out the differences.  
2.3.1  The Goetz case; narrow vs. wide proportionality 
In 1984 on the New York Subway Bernhard Goetz shot four men who had crowded 
around him demanding money in a menacing way. In shooting the men he caused one to 
suffer brain damage and permanent paralysis, and seriously wounded the other three. 
McMahan claims that the four men were potentially liable to attack because they 
threatened Goetz. However Goetz’s actions also harmed the other people on the subway, 
as there was the risk that he might miss his assailants and hit other commuters. These 
people were not potentially liable to attack, as they had done nothing to threaten Goetz. 
This difference in liability allows McMahan to distinguish two types of proportionality. 
Narrow proportionality pertains to harms directed at someone who is potentially liable to 
be harmed and is contrasted with wide proportionality which pertains to harms directed at 
someone who is not potentially liable to any harm.122 Narrow proportionality aligns with 
i. and ii. above, whereas wide proportionality aligns with iii. and iv. It is important to 
note that the liability has to be related to the aim of the harm. So a thief would be 
potentially liable to some harm in defence of property but this liability would not transfer 
to the case of war. Assuming that theft is his only wrongdoing the thief is not potentially 
liable to harm in pursuit of a war aim, despite being liable in another situation. Liability 
to harm is context specific. The focus on liability means that the narrow/wide distinction 
does not identify differences in intentionality. McMahan nevertheless thinks that 
intention is a relevant factor and suggests that we should expect proportionality 
requirements to be more stringent for harms that are intentionally inflicted when 
compared with those that are unintentionally inflicted.123  
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2.3.1.1  Narrow proportionality 
McMahan thinks that the harm Goetz inflicted on the four men was narrowly 
disproportionate because they would probably have left Goetz unharmed if he had simply 
given them the five dollars and if he had refused there was a low probability they would 
have seriously harmed him.124 However the men were potentially liable to some sort of 
defensive action and McMahan suggests that a proportionate response might have been a 
rap over a threatening hand with a truncheon (if Goetz had had one) such that it broke the 
fingers of the aggressor. This is an interesting result for McMahan. For he seems to be 
suggesting that innocent people can be liable to suffer minor or even moderate harm 
when attacked even if they have the means to defend themselves. The reason it is unusual 
is that it suggests that the permissibility of defensive action is contingent on the means at 
the defenders disposal.  So, how the defender armed himself in the morning, whether 
with a pistol, as Goetz did, or with a truncheon, as McMahan suggests would have been 
appropriate, affects the permissibility of defensive action. This is problematic as it 
implies that in order for people to be adequately equipped to permissibly defend 
themselves they should carry an array of weapons with which to distribute the 
appropriate proportionate defensive harm. Further to this, when we realise that situations 
where self-defence is called for are typically heated and rushed, the idea that a range of 
defensive weapons to be selected at the appropriate moment after considering what type 
of response is proportionate is what is required for permissible defensive action to be 
taken seems absurd.  
 
This is not to argue that Goetz’s actions were permissible. I think that they were not, but 
for different reasons to McMahan. Goetz’s actions were disproportionate in a pre-
engagement sense, equivalent to a situation where the relevant principles are jus ad 
bellum. The actions of the aggressors are analogous to the manoeuvrings of a country 
before engaging in war. Asking Goetz for money in a threatening tone is perhaps 
equivalent to stationing troops on a border. Goetz’s response to this of shooting the 
youths was disproportionate in the same way that dropping bombs on the stationed troops 
would be. They are both disproportionate because they escalated the situation into an 
actual conflict. In neither of these examples had an attack actually happened nor is there 
an imminent threat. It is clear that in both cases there is a potential threat of harm, but 
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this is not the same thing as an imminent threat. Goetz’s action was disproportionate 
because it started a physical altercation, not because it was disproportionate in the 
context of the situation. After being asked for money the appropriate and proportional 
response would have been to prepare for a potential attack, perhaps by politely refusing 
whilst reaching for his gun. Similarly in the border case the appropriate response to 
having troops stationed on the border is for a state to prepare to defend itself, perhaps by 
also posting troops. However once attacked Goetz would be permitted to use his weapon 
as through actually threatening Goetz they would have made themselves liable to be 
attacked in that manner.  
 
A problem with my response is that it appears to identify Goetz as the aggressor even 
though he was the one approached and threatened by the youths. We can avoid this 
problem by using Suzanne Uniacke’s distinction between potential aggressors and actual 
aggressors.125  The four men who started the interaction were only potential aggressors. 
To be actual aggressors they would have to act on their intention to harm. I do not think 
that the four men acted on any intention to harm, even if that intention was there. It is of 
course true that the potential threat they posed was unjust, and as such Goetz was 
permitted to respond in some kind. As suggested above, a proportionate response by 
Goetz would have been a potential threat of harm; displaying his gun to demonstrate that 
the initial threat of harm would be unwise to carry out. A disproportionate response to the 
potential threat does not make Goetz the initial aggressor even if his actions escalated the 
conflict.126 Many wars are the result of tit-for-tat escalations where it is difficult to 
determine the aggressor yet in this case it is clearly the four men who instigated the 
conflict. Alternatively Goetz could claim that he felt that the men, in extending their 
hands as part of their demands, constituted an imminent threat. Many cases of potential 
harm constitute a grey area where it is extremely difficult to determine whether or not the 
case in question is an imminent threat or not. The grey area consists of indeterminacy 
about the likelihood that the potential harm will lead to actual harm and also about how 
harmful that will be. To sufficiently determine this it is required to assess a range of 
factors including the degree of harm threatened, the probability of it actually occurring, 
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the ability of the defensive agent to prevent the harm now, the ability of the defensive 
agent to minimise the harm once the aggressive agent causes it, and so on.  I will address 
problems relating to having to assess all these factors below.  
2.3.1.2  Wide proportionality 
As mentioned above Goetz’s actions also harmed the other commuters on the subway. 
Because this was unintentional it means that Goetz’s act was also an example of iv. as he 
unintentionally harmed those who were not potentially liable to any harm.127 McMahan 
thinks that his actions here were also disproportionate, though this time in the wide sense, 
because he imposed risks that were “excessive in relation to the threat he faced from the 
four men.”128 Undertaking such assessments involves making what amounts to lesser evil 
or necessity judgments and indeed this is the function that McMahan sees wide 
proportionality as having. In contrast with narrow proportionality, which is a constraint 
on liability justifications for harm, wide proportionality is a constraint on lesser evil 
justifications for harm.129   
 
These lesser evil justifications apply to iii. where those who are not potentially liable are 
intentionally targeted.  This is the case even though the requirement of discrimination, 
which forbids the targeting of illegitimate targets, applies.130 But many just war theorists 
do not believe that the requirement of discrimination is absolute. Walzer, for instance, 
thinks that in conditions of supreme emergency it can be permissible, and perhaps even 
required, to violate the requirement of discrimination.131 The implication is that if the 
requirement of discrimination is not absolute, then when it is overridden becomes a 
matter of proportionality. The benefits that will enter into a proportionality calculation 
regarding iii. (where those not potentially liable are intentionally targeted) will have to be 
very substantial if the act is to be allowed.  
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2.3.2  Application of proportionality 
It is commonly assumed that when applying the proportionality requirement to war the 
only aspect that is relevant is what McMahan has classified as wide proportionality. It is 
peculiar that narrow proportionality, which plays a major role in individual cases of self-
defense, does not have an equally important role in war. McMahan identifies the reason 
for this as lying in the traditional view of just war theory, which maintains that during 
war all combatants are liable to any harm that may come from military attack. As any 
harm to which a person is liable is necessarily proportionate, all attacks on military 
personnel are proportionate. As all attacks are proportionate there is no place for 
deliberation regarding the narrow proportionality requirement and so it is ignored. 
Because McMahan disagrees that all combatants are liable to attack he has to include 
narrow proportionality in his analysis of unjust combatants.  He argues that unjust 
combatants cannot be proportionate in either the narrow or the wide sense except when 
they are preventing just combatants from acting wrongly. This is because for narrow 
proportionality to apply the person suffering the harm has to be potentially liable. 
McMahan has argued that just combatants do not become liable to attack simply by 
fighting or posing a threat. Therefore under McMahan’s analysis attacks on just 
combatants come under the scope of wide proportionality. Most of the actions of unjust 
combatants will contribute to the unjust war aim. This means that they will not be 
contributing to any good outcomes to weigh against the bad outcomes of killing those not 
potentially liable to attack.   Because of this McMahan thinks “attacks by unjust 
combatants against just combatants … are in practice very unlikely ever to be 
proportionate in the wide sense.”132 
2.4  Rodin’s Response to McMahan 
McMahan’s development of the concept of proportionality consists in identifying that the 
factors of liability and intention are relevant in determining whether different acts are 
proportionate. Rodin takes this idea further and argues that we need more factors than 
those McMahan identifies to provide an adequate account of proportionality.  He also 
argues that we should understand the relationship between the various factors in a 
different way to McMahan. He argues that we should not try and identify different types 
of acts that feature all the factors as that is overly complicated, but rather we should 
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understand proportionality judgments as consisting of the relationship between the 
different factors, which are the normative status of the acts of agents.  
 
It is curious that McMahan does not introduce more factors himself. In two recent papers 
McMahan indicates that he is also aware of other factors relevant to proportionality 
judgements, yet maintains the distinction between narrow and wide proportionality.133 In 
particular he argues that how bad side effects (in wide proportionality) are caused is a 
factor that affects the permissibility of the action.134 He also indicates that determining 
liability to defensive harm (i.e. in narrow proportionality) involves factors such as the 
degree of moral responsibility for the threat and how the threat would be reduced by the 
defensive harm.135 So it seems that McMahan is aware that more factors are relevant in 
proportionality calculations than the two he prioritises. Rodin develops this point by 
pointing out that whilst McMahan is correct in identifying the importance of the intention 
of the defending agent (D), he ignores the intentions of the attacking agent (A), which 
also must be relevant.136 Fitting these different factors into McMahan’s structure of 
proportionality acts would quickly result in a complicated proliferation of acts that 
accounted for each of the various combinations of relevant factors. Rodin proposes 
something slightly simpler. He thinks that all justifications for harm, including liability 
and lesser evil justifications, should be conceived as a “relationship between the 
normative status of the acts of agents.”137 Determining the normative status involves 
considering both the factors that McMahan introduces as well as others that he has 
omitted. Rodin identifies a total of 14 factors with eight relevant to the threatening agent 
and six relevant to the defending agent.138 I do not have space to fully discuss all 14 
factors so I will limit discussion to factors where I disagree with Rodin’s analysis. I will 
mention the most important factors in Section 2.4.4 when I discuss how the factors work 
together to produce justifications for harm. Overall I do think that Rodin’s approach here 
is the right one. Justifying harm is not a simple endeavour, and his approach allows for 
the complex factors that are relevant to be considered. 
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2.4.1  Justification of the Threatened Harm 
The first factor I will look at is the justification for the threatened harm. In particular, this 
includes harms that are not proscribed, and are therefore justified, by moral or legal 
norms. This category encompasses typical side-effect and externality harms.139 Rodin has 
us consider as examples the harm of congestion that a driver contributes to, or the harm 
to a competitor by a shopkeep’s competitive pricing. These are harms that are not 
proscribed and do not generate defensive rights.  
 
Rodin thinks that this category of harms provides a solution to McMahan’s case of the 
conscientious driver.140 In this case, a driver of a vehicle, which is meticulously 
maintained, decides to drive to the movies. The driver always drives with care, yet on the 
way to the cinema the vehicle is subject to a freak event that could not have been 
anticipated which results in the car veering out of control in the direction of a 
pedestrian.141 Given the fact that it is known that driving “carries a small risk of causing 
great though unintended harm” McMahan argues that the driver carries some 
responsibility for the harm imposed upon the pedestrian. McMahan sees this 
responsibility as sufficient for the driver to be liable to defensive action to prevent the 
killing of the pedestrian.  
 
Rodin argues against what he terms an “intuitively uncomfortable result.”142 He thinks it 
can be avoided it we distinguish between “responsibility for imposing the risk of harm 
and responsibility for the harm itself.”143 It is true that the driver is responsible for 
imposing the risk of harm to the pedestrian. But because the driver had taken due care to 
offset the risk, imposing the risk was not proscribed. As we have seen above, non-
proscribed risks are not risks that people have a right against. It is true that what the 
pedestrian does have a right against, being struck by a car, is something that is 
proscribed, but Rodin argues that this is not an action that the driver is responsible for.144 
The stipulation that it is a freak event that causes the threat of harm is important. It seems 
to suggest a mechanical failure or something comparable. Rodin thinks that such an event 
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140 I discuss this case in more detail in Chapter 4.  
141 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 165. 
142 Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, p. 85. 
143 Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, p. 85. 
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would then be analogous to cases of physical compulsion like Nozick’s falling fat 
man.145 This seems right when we compare it with a case where the freak accident was 
due to the driver’s inexcusable negligence. This would leave the driver with, at best, an 
agency defeating excuse which would more plausibly entail that he be liable to defensive 
harm – the result McMahan argues for.  
 
However this result is unsatisfactory for a reason Rodin does not consider. The reason is 
that a distinction of this sort does not help the pedestrian decide what is an appropriate 
response. Consider the pedestrian walking down the street, also going to the cinema. He 
hears a loud bang and turns to see the vehicle hurtling towards him. Being a mechanic, he 
knows that loud bangs can be indicative of freak events. However it could be 
representing a freak event of the type that Rodin thinks the driver is non-responsible for, 
or it could be a freak event of the type that the driver is responsible for. The situation 
does not allow the pedestrian to ascertain which of these two options is the cause of his 
current predicament. Having read Rodin’s paper he knows that the driver is only liable to 
defensive harm if he was not responsible for the freak event. But as he has no way of 
knowing this he does not know if he is permitted to defend himself. This is only a 
problem if one thinks that it is not permissible to defend yourself against innocent threats 
(as both McMahan and Rodin do). If one thinks that you are able to defend yourself 
against innocent threats, then the problem does not arise.146 It is interesting to note that 
only in the case where the driver is not responsible for the initial threat of harm, e.g. 
where he is an innocent threat, is the driver permitted to defend himself from the 
pedestrian’s defensive harm. If the driver has responsibility for the initial threat of harm, 
suppose that the vehicle was out of warranty and he had recently become aware of a 
serious manufacturing defect, then he is not permitted to defend himself.  	  
2.4.2 Causal and Temporal Proximity to the Threatened Harm  
The second factor I am going to look at is the temporal and causal proximity of the 
attacking agent A to the threatened harm. Liability to defensive harm is typically subject 
to a requirement of temporal imminence. It rules out both preventive harm that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, p. 85. I discussed this case in more detail in Section 1.2.  
146 I argued for this in Section 1.2.1.  
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“significantly prior”147 to the threatened harm and defensive harm inflicted on a past 
aggressor. An example of the latter case would be one where D suffers from a life 
threatening organ failure that was culpably inflicted by A a year ago. Rodin thinks that it 
is not clear that A is liable to be killed for organ harvesting by D, even if that was the 
only way of D’s life being preserved.148 Similarly, causal proximity is also a typical 
restriction on liability to defensive harm. Rodin gives us an example where A is a 
cutler.149 Supposing that A made a knife which was then used by a third party to threaten 
the life of D most people believe that A would not be liable to be killed even if that were 
the only way to prevent the attack. 
 
Rodin thinks there is little doubt that causal and temporal proximity affect liability. 
However there lies a crucial question in whether they are relevant only because of their 
relevance to the responsibility of A or if they play an independent role. This question is 
important because it has implications as to whether noncombatants can ever be 
permissible targets in war.  
 
I am unconvinced as to the importance of causal and temporal proximity in diminishing 
liability. This is because in regards to the cutler case, I think the intuition is best 
explained with regards to the type of harm that the cutler poses and not the causal 
distance. The reason that there is an intuition against harming the cutler is because of the 
factor discussed above - the act of making of a knife is a non-proscribed harm and as 
such does not generate defensive rights. We might have a different intuition (where the 
cutler would be liable to be killed if it was the only means to prevent an attack) to a 
modification of the cutler case that Rodin mentions in a footnote, where the cutler 
fashions a special blade with the direct intention of it being able to penetrate D’s special 
armour.150 Rodin attributes this different intuition to the cutler’s direct intention to harm 
but it seems equally plausible that there is a prohibition on creating (and using) weapons 
with the particular purpose of harming innocent individuals.  
 
I also do not think temporal proximity is as important as Rodin thinks it is. Imagine a 
case where a farrier is walking to visit the cutler. The farrier inadvertently sets off a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, p. 89. 
148 Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, p. 89. 
149 Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, p. 90.  
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bomb that was planted by the person who is trying to kill D. The only way for D to 
prevent his imminent death is through killing the farrier. It seems that it ought to be that 
D is able to kill both the farrier in this case and the cutler in the special blade case. This is 
despite the supposedly relevant difference of temporal proximity. Temporal proximity is 
not a relevant factor in liability to harm if that harm is the only way to prevent death. The 
reason that temporal proximity seems like it diminishes liability to harm is because it is 
hard to escape the notion that as more time passes the responsibility is diminished. This 
is due to the fact that over time more options become available for others to influence 
events and for alternate options to be taken. But if it is stipulated that acting against the 
cutler is the only way to avert an attack then we should be consistent and reject the 
purported relevance of temporal proximity.  
2.4.3 Probability of the Defensive Harm Averting the Threatened 
Harm 
The next factor I am going to discuss is the probability of the defensive harm averting the 
threatened harm. If there is an extremely low probability that D’s action (of inflicting 
defensive harm on A) is likely to succeed in averting the threatened harm then it seems 
that this will diminish A’s liability to that defensive harm.151 The jus ad bellum principle 
of likelihood of success is the representation of this factor. If there is no likelihood of 
success in averting the threatened harm “then there is no liability.”152  
 
Rodin discusses an objection of Daniel Statman that brings out the focus of a liability 
account – the interaction of agency between different persons. Statman claims that this 
principle as puzzling.153 Supposing that a woman with two bullets in a gun is about to be 
attacked and raped by five men, he argues that she would be permitted to use the bullets 
and kill two of the men despite the fact that she would still face rape from the other three. 
Rodin counters this by reminding us that each of the men is individually liable to be 
killed “because this measure would succeed in averting their rape.”154 Rodin identifies 
Statman’s concerns as having more force in cases of hopeless defence against a single 
assailant. In cases like these it seems odd to say that a victim would not be permitted to 
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break an arm of the assailant even though this would not prevent the rape. Rodin 
identifies two factors that could explain this. First, it could be that delaying the infliction 
of a threatened harm can provide a basis for liability – even when preventing the harm is 
ultimately not possible.155 Second, when we talk about there being no prospect of 
success, we actually mean a very low prospect (this is similar to my discussion of 
proximity). And conversely when compared to the magnitude of the defensive harm, 
lower probabilities of success are justified when there is an increase in factors relevant to 
the threatening agent, especially when the aggressive harm threatens innocent life and the 
integrity of a person. Rodin suggests that if it were the case that inflicting defensive harm 
on A would not “prevent, delay, or ameliorate the threatened harm in any way” then it 
would be difficult to see how A could be liable to defensive harm.156 Whilst this might be 
true in a thought experiment, fortunately it is difficult to conceive a real world scenario 
where all of these factors were both satisfied and known with absolute certainty by D, 
and as such it seems likely that D would typically be permitted to inflict defensive harm 
upon A. 
2.4.4 How the Factors Work Together 
Rodin takes the 14 factors to work together to produce both liability and lesser evil 
justifications of defensive harm.  In either case A is liable to defensive harm/has a lesser 
evil justification from D if and only if the combination of factors relevant to A exceeds, 
in the relevant way, the combination of factors relevant to D.157 The important issue is 
how to determine the relevant way the factors interact. A difference between lesser evil 
and liability justifications is the factors that constitute necessary and sufficient 
conditions. For liability justifications, two factors that are relevant to A are necessary 
conditions: 3. Responsibility for the threatened harm and 4. Justification of the 
threatened harm. A must be responsible for the threatened harm and the threatened harm 
must either be unjustified or be a violation of rights.158 For lesser evil justifications, two 
different factors relevant to A are necessary: 1. Magnitude of the threatened harm and 2. 
Probability of the threatened harm occurring. These act as necessary conditions for 
lesser evil justifications. Rodin also identifies one factor relevant to D as a sufficient 
condition for a lesser evil justification: 9. Magnitude of the defensive harm. This is a 
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sufficient condition when the harm is zero because “when D can avert a threatened harm 
without inflicting any harm at all, then it is necessarily a lesser evil and this is sufficient 
for justification.”159 In both lesser evil and liability justifications, all the other factors are 
additive in that they increase or decrease the evil or bad effects on either side of the 
relationship without their presence or absence being necessary or sufficient conditions for 
justification.160  
 
Rodin’s analysis is the closest to the correct view on proportionality. It is possible to 
quibble over the factors that are relevant and the importance particular factors have, as I 
have done in parts. However this quibbling does not count against Rodin’s fundamental 
insight, which builds upon McMahan’s developments, that both narrow and wide 
proportionality consist of the relationship between the normative status of the acts of 
agents. Determining whether an act is proportional consists in much more than simply 
weighing up the harms and benefits of an action as the traditional view advocates. 
Rather, we should weigh factors relevant to the threatening agent against the factors 
relevant to the threatening agent. It is important to note that Rodin’s analysis relies very 
heavily upon factors relevant to individual agents that do not analogise cleanly to inter-
state ad bellum proportionality justifications. However it could be the case that Rodin’s 
approach is also relevant for ad bellum proportionality but with a modified set of factors. 
This is especially likely if we accept McMahan’s assumption that the conditions of 
permissible moral action are no different in war than in self-defence. This assumption 
does not hinder Rodin’s account here as he is responding to McMahan and thereby 
working in a similar framework. 
2.5 A Problem with Revised Accounts 
I will finish this chapter with a criticism of the general approach by McMahan and 
Rodin. The shared feature between the two accounts is the identification of several 
factors as being integral to a proper understanding of proportionality. A problem with an 
account where multiple factors are at play is that it is difficult to prescribe a template for 
agents to follow. Hobbes recognised this difficulty and conceded that only individuals are 
capable of determining when they are imminently threatened, which is why people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, p. 98. 
160 Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, p. 98. 
52	  
	  
cannot give up the right to self-defense from the state.161 In Chapter 21 of Leviathan 
Hobbes declares that “covenants, not to defend a man’s own body, are void.”162 This 
leads Hobbes to accept the implication that: “If the sovereign command a man, though 
justly condemned, to … not resist those that assault him, … that man [has] the liberty to 
disobey.”163 Though I want to resist the conclusion that even those who are justly harmed 
retain the liberty to fight back (and I think McMahan’s arguments in Chapter One show 
why this is false) Hobbes’ point about each individual being best placed to determine 
“the aptest means thereunto” defend himself is harder to resist.164 This is problematic as 
it gives instincts an ethical priority that we often want to avoid. Fortunately it is not clear 
that this worry about instincts applies to states and therefore is not applicable in ad 
bellum considerations. Unlike Goetz and other cases of individual defence, states are 
very rarely confronted with potential life or death decisions that require immediate 
action. This does not mean to say that states do not face imminent threats but rather that 
the imminent threat for a state is not as pressing as an imminent threat for an individual. 
States should be held to higher standards of ethical consideration than individuals, as 
states, generally, have more time to consider the complex factors that are relevant in such 
a decision, whereas individuals do not and are reliant upon instincts. Indeed, it is 
plausible that the institutions of states allow for better decision making capacities.  
 
Of course, this response to Hobbes accounts for ad bellum difficulties, but not for in bello 
difficulties. In the case of in bello concerns it is typical that soldiers trust that many of the 
factors will have already been decided for them, especially that the magnitude of the 
threatened harm is grave, and that there is no justification for the threatened harm. This 
division of labour means that it should be easier for combatants, than ordinary 
noncombatants to satisfy proportionality requirements, provided (and this is a big 
‘provided’) the state that they serve makes morally permissible decisions. This is because 
some of the factors will already be ticked for them. Ultimately I do not accept the 
criticism that the proliferation of factors is unhelpful. This is because it already seems 
that just war theory has something similar in that various factors such as necessity, 
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discrimination and so on need to be satisfied in order for an act to be permissible. 
Further, in the majority of cases the factors are going to be relatively clear. For instance it 
is likely a defendant will know whether they are responsible for the harm they face, or 
whether there are any pre-existing duties of care.165 The most difficult cases, where there 
are epistemic concerns are going to be problematic for most other justifications of 
defensive harm as well – it is everyman’s problem. It is also everyman’s problem in the 
sense that it is difficult to analyse what is permissible defensive conduct, and Rodin’s 
analysis seems to me to be a big step in towards determining the answer. 
2.6  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at the development of proportionality from the traditional 
view to Hurka, and then the radical developments of McMahan and Rodin who develop 
the insight that there is more to proportionality than weighing up harms and benefits. I 
have argued that Rodin’s approach to proportionality, which involves weighing up 
multiple normative factors, is the closest thing to the right view. Some of the issues 
raised in this chapter have wider implications. In particular I will be looking further at 
one of Rodin’s necessary conditions for liability justifications, the attacking agent’s 
responsibility for the unjust threat of harm, in closer detail in Chapter Four.  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




3. Lazar’s Responsibility Dilemma 
Lazar agrees with McMahan regarding his rejection of the moral equality of combatants. 
However Lazar finds fault with McMahan’s alternate theory of liability to be harmed, the 
responsibility account. The reason for this is that he thinks that it might have implications 
that most would reject.166 He thinks that the responsibility account is subject to two 
objections, the contingent pacifist objection and the total war objection, which taken 
together constitute two horns of a ‘Responsibility Dilemma’. The dilemma rests on the 
claim that many unjust combatants have the same level of responsibility for the threat of 
harm as unjust noncombatants. Lazar develops this to argue that if some unjust 
combatants are not liable, due to not being sufficiently responsible, then just combatants 
are required to discriminate between the unjust combatants and their differing degrees of 
responsibility. As this requires epistemic access that is near impossible, it seems that 
though fighting a just war may be a theoretical possibility; in practice we should be 
pacifists. Avoiding this horn of the dilemma is going to require setting the liability bar 
low. This then opens up the responsibility account to the total war objection by allowing 
many noncombatants to be intentionally targeted and killed. This chapter will proceed by 
first setting out the dilemma. This will involve explaining why unjust combatants and 
unjust noncombatants have a similar level of responsibility and then setting out in more 
detail the two horns. Second, I will argue that McMahan’s attempt to clarify his account 
of liability fails. This is because of problems with the factors he introduces that are 
independent of responsibility. In the third section I will consider responses to the 
contingent pacifism horn by McMahan, who focuses on counterfactuals and luck, and 
Strawser, who focuses on epistemic difficulties. In the fourth and final section I will 
consider three responses to the total war horn; the negligible contribution of unjust 
noncombatants; the justified contribution of unjust noncombatants and the 
ineffectiveness of targeting noncombatants. I will argue that all of these responses fail 
and that the dilemma stands. 
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3.1  The Responsibility Dilemma 
The force of the responsibility dilemma lies in Lazar’s claim that many noncombatants 
have a similar level of responsibility for the threat in war as combatants. The first part of 
this section will show how Lazar establishes that claim. 
 
A key component of McMahan’s responsibility account is that merely posing a threat is 
neither sufficient nor necessary for liability to defensive harm.167 This is because one can 
pose a threat without being agent-responsible for it, for example if a person was rendered 
unconscious and used as a projectile. One can also be responsible for a threat without 
actually posing it, perhaps by using another as a projectile. Rather, it is responsibility for 
the threatened harm, which must be objectively unjust, that grounds liability to attack.  
However the presupposition that some causal contribution is required to be responsible 
for the threat remains. The problem that Lazar identifies is that “it is unclear how to 
measure that contribution, and how its size affects the degree of responsibility.”168 Here 
is an example to illustrate this: Suppose homeowner H commissions tradesman T to 
install a platform on H’s property from which H can shoot game. H is severely disabled 
with limited movement and so part of the commission involves setting a gun up and 
sighting it, and loading it. When H prepares to use the gun for the first time he notices his 
nemesis N who has wandered onto his land and is in the gun’s sights. All that is required 
for H to shoot N is to pull the trigger (as T sighted and loaded the gun). H shoots N and 
kills him, which, we can stipulate, was objectively wrong. It seems that the majority of 
the responsibility for this threat lies with H; he is maximally morally responsible and 
blameworthy. Yet T made a significantly larger causal contribution to the threat than H - 
he constructed the platform, loaded the gun and sighted it! At most, we can say that T is 
agent-responsible, as his voluntary actions contributed to the threat. The point is that a 
significant causal contribution to a threat does not by itself translate to significant moral 
responsibility for that threat. If one thinks that pulling a trigger is a significant causal 
contribution, then consider a mafia boss who hires a hit man to kill a target. The degree 
of the boss’s causal contribution is negligible; asking a person to pose a threat is 
markedly different than physically using a person as a projectile threat. The point here is 
that even though it seems a causal contribution is required in order to be responsible for a 
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threat, it is difficult to evaluate the degree of the casual contribution with respect to 
responsibility.  
 
Lazar acknowledges that despite this difficulty many will think that the fact that 
combatants make a larger causal contribution to the unjust threat than uncombatants is a 
relevant difference when determining different levels of responsibility. Lazar responds to 
this by simply arguing that if there is a difference, it is not universal. That is: “many 
combatants make small and unnecessary causal contributions to micro- and macro-
threats, and as such are similarly positioned to many noncombatants.”169  Micro-threats 
are those that threaten individuals, whereas macro-threats are those which a state poses to 
its opponent.170 An agent can contribute to either of these threats in two ways, by either 
being the agent of the threat or contributing towards a threat that is posed by another.171 
Lazar argues that many combatants are “wholly ineffective in war”, making little to no 
contribution to micro-threats or to the larger macro-threat, due in large part to 
combatants’ “natural aversion to killing”.172 Of those who make a little contribution, 
many of them can only be said to facilitate the threat, through being a cook, medic, and 
so on. As such they are making small contributions to micro-threats, and even smaller 
contributions to the overall macro-threat. Lazar concludes that many of the contributions 
made by unjust combatants are going to be small and unnecessary. This is a problem for 
McMahan, for if small and unnecessary contributions to unjust threats are sufficient for 
liability to attack in war, then many more noncombatants than seems plausible 
(McMahan is open to some noncombatants being liable to attack173) are going to be liable 
to attack. Many noncombatants make individually small and unnecessary contributions to 
the threat posed by their side in a war. These include direct contributions such as taxes, 
supplying military necessities, and rationing. They also include indirect contributions 
such as building the state’s capacity, giving it the strength to focus on a war, providing it 
with legitimacy through voting and even contributions made towards giving combatants 
skills such as those a maths teacher imparts to a future gunner.174 Indeed in a modern 
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state it seems that almost every person contributes in some way to the capacity of the 
state to act. Though these contributions are small and unnecessary, that does nothing, 
Lazar concludes, to distinguish them from the contributions of many combatants. If those 
combatants are sufficiently responsible then it seems so are noncombatants.175  
3.1.2  Why epistemic problems support contingent pacifism 
Lazar also focuses on the excuses that might be available to unjust noncombatants. This 
is important as excuses work to reduce the culpability of agents. If the actions of unjust 
combatants are excused then for it to be permissible to target them, the liability bar must 
be set low. They will still be liable, as they will presumably have some responsibility for 
the objectively unjust threat that they pose, but it may only be appropriate to attribute 
agent-responsibility to them. As we shall see below, this opens the door for the other 
horn of the dilemma, the total war objection. 
 
Lazar states that combatants have an epistemic excuse when they are nonculpably 
ignorant of the fact that they contribute to an unjust threat.176 This means that their 
mistaken beliefs are going to be sufficiently epistemically justified given the 
circumstances.177 Lazar argues that McMahan fails to take into account factors such as 
uncertainty and reasonable partiality that “lower the epistemic burden on combatants”.178 
A key factor here is the indeterminacy of both moral and non-moral principles. Whilst 
there may be areas of general agreement, real wars tend to take place on the “fuzzy edges 
of these areas”.179 Wars also often feature new technologies such as poison gas, nuclear 
weapons, or drones that are introduced and used at a pace that outstrips the typically staid 
pace of academic thought. If experts are unable to agree on the relevant moral principles 
facing soldiers, then it seems unreasonable to expect soldiers to do so. Even if there were 
clear moral principles it is common and easy for the nonmoral facts to be obscured or 
even manufactured.180 This is especially true of states determined to wage war. A classic 
example of this is the Gleiwitz incident, the Nazi staged attack that was used to justify 
invading Poland. Democratic and non-democratic governments alike have a chequered 
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history of being open and honest about the decisions to go to war.181 Granted, there might 
be good reasons for secrecy, such as protecting intelligence sources, but this does not 
help combatants decide whether the war their country is preparing to launch is just or not.  
 
Supposing that a combatant is able to determine that they have a just cause, they 
encounter further epistemic difficulties. For in order to fight justly combatants need to 
determine who is liable to be killed and to do that they need to know the degree of 
responsibility their opponent has for the threat posed. Lazar lists what is required for just 
combatants to determine, often in the heat of battle, about each of their opponents: 
“[T]hey must know at least their adversaries’ personal histories, the context of their 
decision to fight, their connection to a particular threat, their capacity for responsible 
agency, [and] their beliefs and intentions”.182 Determining this, Lazar claims, “is near 
impossible.”183 
 
Another aspect that Lazar argues can lower the epistemic burden that combatants must 
meet to be excused is that of reasonable partiality. This is because wars often endanger 
those closest to us and our country. Lazar thinks that this is relevant to the level of 
epistemic burden we reasonably set for unjust combatants because “when the costs of a 
mistake could fall so heavily on those that we care about, we should be granted a certain 
epistemic allowance.”184 The point is not that reasonable partiality justifies intentional 
wrongs or that it provides a full excuse when known non-liable parties are attacked. 
Lazar argues instead for the weaker claim that for combatants in conditions of 
uncertainty as to the justice of their cause “reasonable partiality lowers the degree of 
credence their belief that their war is justified must meet, in order to afford a full 
excuse.”185  
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Lazar’s arguments work together to show that many more unjust combatants are going to 
be epistemically excused than McMahan allows. Rather than being culpable for the 
unjust threats they are only going to be agent-responsible. Setting the liability bar higher 
than agent-responsibility will therefore result in many unjust combatants not being liable 
to be killed. Because it is in practice impossible to determine which unjust combatants 
are liable and which are not (due to either being excused or non-responsible), this renders 
fighting wars justly practically impossible.186 Therefore we reach the conclusion of the 
contingent pacifism horn; we should be pacifists if it is practically impossible to fight 
wars justly. To make it permissible to fight unjust combatants, and thereby get around 
this horn, McMahan needs to set the liability bar of his account low. Unfortunately this 
opens the door for Lazar’s total war horn, which I will set out now. 
3.1.3  The total war horn 
The conclusion of the total war horn is a problem for McMahan because it entails that 
many unjust noncombatants are liable to attack in war. McMahan thinks he can resist this 
problem by using narrow proportionality, which as we saw in Chapter Two identifies 
those who are liable to attack, and by then claiming that unjust noncombatants are not 
liable to attack. Lazar argues that McMahan applies both the liability bar and just cause 
(in proportionality calculations) inconsistently with respect to combatants and 
noncombatants.187 Lazar thinks it is likely that within the sets of combatants and 
noncombatants there will be a range from agent-responsibility to culpability, rather than a 
clear differentiation of levels of responsibility between the two sets. So some combatants 
will be (merely) agent-responsible and some non-combatants culpable, and vice versa. 
This means that in war, when the threat faced is sufficiently serious (it is a war after all!) 
and lives of just combatants or noncombatants can be saved by killing agent-responsible 
unjust noncombatants then McMahan’s theory, consistently applied, should permit 
this.188 This is because under his account minimal responsibility is sufficient for liability 
and it is fairer that the unjust noncombatants bear the costs rather the just combatants or 
just uncombatants who have no responsibility at all for the threat. This means that narrow 
proportionality cannot be used to protect unjust noncombatants against the total war 
objection because when properly applied to unjust noncombatants it highlights small, but 
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relevant differences that “make all the difference in the allocation of unavoidable 
harms.”189 
 
Lazar considers one way that narrow proportionality might protect noncombatants - 
through the distribution of risk. McMahan argues that the less responsible the just 
combatants’ targets are, the more risk the just combatants have to take upon themselves 
in order to minimise harm to the targets.190 So if the targets are culpable, then less risk 
should be taken than if the targets were merely agent-responsible. The main problem that 
Lazar identifies here is that whilst this may work in more general cases of distributing 
harm, in war the risk that is being assumed is always that of being killed.191 The problem 
is that death is an indivisible harm and assuming more risks in order to minimise harm 
will result in the deaths of non-liable combatants for the benefit of reduced harm to those 
who are liable.192 This is an unacceptable result as it is unfair for those who are non-
liable (the just combatants) to bear risks that will increase the likelihood that they will 
die, in order to reduce the harm that would fall upon those who are liable to receive it 
(the unjust noncombatants). 
 
So the responsibility dilemma claims that McMahan’s responsibility account for liability 
to attack in war faces an internal dilemma. The first horn, the contingent pacifist horn, 
argues that unless the liability bar is set low then many unjust combatants will not be 
liable to attack. However if the bar is set too low then the second horn, the total war horn, 
arises: many unjust noncombatants will be liable to attack. In the next part of this chapter 
I will look at responses to the dilemma. I will first look at an attempt by McMahan to 
distinguish between the liability of combatants and noncombatants. If McMahan can 
show why unjust combatants are liable and unjust noncombatants are not, then the main 
claim of the dilemma will be undermined. 
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3.2  McMahan’s Response to the Dilemma 
McMahan has recently responded to Lazar’s responsibility dilemma.193 His first aim is to 
show that most unjust combatants are liable whilst most unjust noncombatants are not by 
elucidating the conditions of liability. McMahan hopes that this clarification will show 
that the responsibility account can walk the middle ground and avoid the horns of the 
dilemma. He states that whether and to what a person is liable depends on the functions 
of the following factors:194 
 
1) The expected wrongful harm that will occur unless the person is harmed 
2) The degree of the person’s causal contribution to the harm 
3) Whether the harm is foreseeable, and if so, whether the person contributes to its 
occurrence intentionally, recklessly or negligently  
4) If the person meets the necessary conditions of responsibility for the harm 
5) Whether there are others who are more responsible for the harm and if so by 
how much 
6) The extent to which the expected harm can be expected to be reduced by 
harming the person. (In the case of defensive harming, the extent to which 
successful defence will be effective in reducing the harm depends on the degree 
of the person’s causal contribution to it.) 
 
Below I outline problems with four out of the six conditions; in particular, I try to show 
why these conditions are not helpful when determining liability to attack. If they are not 
able to determine liability to attack simpliciter, they are also not going to be helpful in 
distinguishing between the liability to attack of combatants and noncombatants. I do not 
raise a problem with the fourth and fifth conditions, which pertain to responsibility. This 
is because I am arguing in support of the dilemma, which rests on combatants and 
noncombatants often having similar levels of responsibility for the unjust threat. Indeed, I 
am relying on the fourth condition, as I think they both have responsibility for the harm. 
In addition, because I am arguing that combatants and noncombatants have similar levels 
of responsibility for harm, the fifth condition does not apply.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 McMahan, ‘Who is Morally Liable to be Killed in War’.  
194 McMahan, ‘Who is Morally Liable to be Killed in War’, p. 548 
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A problem with the first factor is that it can be difficult to actually identify where the 
wrongful harm will occur. In ‘Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self-Defense’ Lazar 
draws on Michael Otsuka’s example of a Guest who, when going to shake Dignitary’s 
hand, has a hologram of a gun projected onto his hand.195 Dignitary is used to threats 
upon her life and, acting upon the reasonable belief that Guest is going to kill her, draws 
her pistol in order to shoot Guest in self-defence.196  Lazar uses this case to show that two 
agent-responsible persons can both be blamelessly responsible for a forced-choice 
situation arising.197 This is relevant because it highlights the difficulty of actually 
identifying the wrongful harm that needs to be prevented. If both parties are agent-
responsible for a forced-choice situation arising (where harm needs to be distributed) 
then it is not clear where the wrongful harm will fall. This is because it is not clear who 
will be wronged as each party is responsible for imposing “the risk of suffering an 
unjustified harm.”198  
 
A problem with the second factor has already been discussed above in Section 3.1. The 
examples of the tradesman and the mafia boss both highlight the difficulties of linking 
the degree of the causal contribution to liability. At most all that seems to be required is 
that the attacking agent does make some causal contribution. However it could be the 
case that the degree of contribution could be relevant in determining how necessary 
harming that person is. So it could be that the larger a person’s causal contribution the 
more effective, generally, harming them will be in preventing the expected wrongful 
harm. But if this is what is meant by this factor then it seems to have collapsed into 
simply another way of stipulating the first and the sixth factor. So all that should be 
required is that a person causally contributed to the harm, and the thus the degree of their 
contribution may be ignored as no conclusions can be drawn from that independent of the 
other factors. 
 
A problem with the third factor is that its scope is too wide. This is evident when we 
consider it in tandem with McMahan’s claim that one does not have to pose the threat 
oneself in order to be responsible for it. All that is required is a voluntary causal 
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contribution. Lazar gives the example of A, who has been sacked from his job and 
blames his boss B.199 In order to take revenge he buys a gun from gunsmith C. C is 
unaware of his intentions and sells the gun to A, who then proceeds, with responsibility, 
to attack B. The problem with the foreseeability factor is that it entails that C is agent-
responsible, and therefore has some liability, for the attack on B because C voluntarily 
facilitated the threat. This is because C, like the conscientious driver with regards to 
driving in Chapter Two, knows that selling guns is a risky business and that harm may 
come from it. This means that if killing C was the only way for B to fend off the attack 
then it would be permissible for B to do so because the agent-responsibility of C renders 
C liable. The reason this scope of foreseeability is too wide is that it is foreseeable that 
virtually any good will be able to be used to harm someone. In particular I foresee this 
implicating virtually any merchant. Water can be used to drown someone, a broomhandle 
can be sharpened and used to stab somebody, and, if the movies are to be believed, it is 
even possible to kill someone with a carrot.200 It is extremely counterintuitive that the 
vendor be liable to defensive attack when one of their goods is used impermissibly. If it 
is deemed permissible for a product to be sold, then the vendor should prima facie not be 
responsible for harm threatened with that product. Because McMahan’s foreseeability 
factor has that result, it should be discounted. 
 
A problem with the sixth factor is that it is simply wrong to say that the extent to which 
defence will be successful depends on the degree of person’s causal contribution to it. 
That is going to depend on the nature of the unjust attack. If it is possible to make an 
unjust attack hit someone else (perhaps by using them as a shield) then the extent of that 
person’s causal contribution is entirely immaterial. Despite their different causal 
contributions the tradesman, the mafia boss, and the gunsmith are all equally able to stop 
a bullet with their bodies. 
 
So it seems that the majority of the elements that make up McMahan’s account of 
liability in his response to Lazar have problems when individually considered. This is a 
problem for McMahan because it seems that these elements fail to accurately capture 
what is necessary for liability to defensive harm. If they do not serve to help determine 
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liability to defensive harm generally, then they are not going to be able to help 
differentiate the liability of unjust combatants from unjust noncombatants.  
3.3  Responses to the Contingent Pacifism Horn  
I will now turn my attention to the rebuttals that McMahan and Strawser make in 
response to the contingent pacifism horn. McMahan focuses on the actual contributions 
that combatants make to the threat as well as the conditional willingness of combatants to 
kill. McMahan considers that these factors make most unjust noncombatants liable to 
attack. In contrast, Strawser focuses on the epistemic difficulties. In both instances I will 
argue that their rebuttals fail. 
3.3.1  What unjust combatants do and would do 
McMahan observes that whilst it may be true that many noncombatants do not make a 
significant causal contribution to threats that their side poses it seems clear that 
somebody is posing a threat, as many people get killed and wounded in war! McMahan 
says that even though only some unjust combatants end up killing, 
 
“it is true of almost all of the others that they go armed into a war zone and would kill just combatants 
rather than allow themselves or their comrades to be killed. That their circumstances do not prompt them to 
kill is a matter of luck in avoiding a situation in which they must kill or be killed.”201  
Further, the fact that unjust combatants are “able and conditionally committed to kill”202 
and the fact that the conditions that would lead them to kill are significantly probable 
they “significantly increase the objective risk”203 that they will harm non-liable people. It 
is the conditional willingness of combatants to kill which subsequently increases the 
objective risk that combatants pose. This makes most unjust combatants liable to attack.  
 
First, McMahan places a lot of weight on counterfactual conditionals. Not only is this 
odd for someone who stipulates that “liability depends on what a person does”204, but the 
conditional he asserts is problematic. As we saw above, McMahan claims that the 
conditional that unjust combatants would attack if they were in a kill or be killed 
situation increases the objective risk that innocent people will be killed. This is an 
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empirical claim and unfortunately for McMahan the research does not seem to support 
him. Lazar cites a study by General S.L.A. Marshall that suggests that only 15-25% of 
Allied soldiers in World War II who could have fired their weapons did so.205 This 
indicates that these are soldiers in life or death combat situations who chose not to fire. 
This is coupled with the claim based on other studies that most soldiers have a “natural 
aversion to killing”.206 So it is not immediately clear that “almost all” unjust combatants 
would actually pose the threat if placed in a situation where they could.  
 
Maybe what McMahan means is that what combatants do (and therefore what they are 
responsible for) is get into situations where the probability that they will pose a threat is 
higher. This increased probability is the risk that translates to the threat. We saw in 
Chapter Two that Rodin argues that the probability of the threatened harm occurring is a 
necessary condition of lesser evil justifications for harm, and also plays a role in liability 
justifications.207 If we consider a case of a forced game of Russian roulette it is clear that 
the victim is permitted to use lethal defensive force against the aggressor, even if the 
probability of death was small.208 But it seems like playing Russian roulette is a different 
kind of probability to entering a combat zone. Russian roulette is more immediate, in the 
sense that when the trigger is pulled the probability is very real and calculable. In other 
instances where there is a potential risk of harm it is not permissible to use lethal 
defensive force. For instance, pedestrians are not permitted to destroy every car that 
drives past them even though, as the case of the conscientious driver illustrated, there is a 
risk that the car might careen out of control and threaten them. However this example 
serves to illustrate that what is relevant about probability and risk in liability 
justifications is the size of that probability. One of the reasons that it is impermissible to 
destroy every car that drives past is because the probability of the car actually threatening 
you is extremely low. It is undeniable that the likelihood of unjust combatants posing a 
threat is higher than that of unjust noncombatants. However it is not clear that the 
difference is great enough to justify liability to attack. This is especially the case when 
we consider, as I do in the next paragraph, McMahan’s reliance on luck, and the role luck 
plays in determining who becomes a combatant. 
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Second, the counterfactual responsibility that McMahan is arguing for faces a further 
problem with its reliance on luck. For, as McMahan admits, it is “a matter of luck” 
whether particular combatants actually get into situations where they fire their 
weapons.209 This again highlights an inconsistency with McMahan’s stipulation that 
liability depends on what a person does, for McMahan is claiming that unjust combatants 
are responsible, and therefore liable to attack, for harms that they only avoid posing due 
to luck. So they are liable for what they do not actually do. Here is an example that 
shows why this is problematic and that luck does not convey moral responsibility. 
Suppose there is a conscientious mob boss who likes to do charity work as a balance to 
some of the more questionable activities he undertakes. On one particular day he has an 
act of charity that needs doing, as well as an unjustified hit on an innocent rival. The 
conscientious mob boss cannot decide which of his coerced lackeys should undertake 
each particular task. As all of his lackeys are equally capable of performing either task he 
decides that the best way to decide is by lottery - a system of luck. This results in some of 
the lackeys being selected to carry out the hit, some selected to carry out the charity work 
and others not selected for any task. McMahan would be committed to saying that the 
only reason that the lackeys not carrying out the hit did not, was because they were lucky 
in not being selected. If McMahan is to be consistent he should say that those not 
carrying out the hit are still liable to defensive harm, even if they are doing charity work, 
because “they are conditionally committed to kill.”210  
 
The conscientious mob boss is broadly analogous to states. McMahan admits that states 
commit many wrongs, noting that protesting them all “would be more than a full-time 
job.”211 Similarly states pursue “a great many worthy aims” which citizens can be 
morally justified in contributing to.212 So, like the conscientious mob boss, states commit 
both wrongs and worthy aims and it can be a matter of luck what type of cause a 
particular citizen ends up contributing to. This is particularly relevant to war time 
because in a vast majority of wars the citizenry is compelled to fight (even the now 
paradigmatic just cause of World War II required conscription) in the same way the 
conscientious mob boss’ lackeys are compelled to carry out the hit if selected for that. 
Similarly it is a matter of luck as to whether a particular person ends up on the frontline 
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or not. This is especially true of conscription where medical conditions (which we have 
no control over) can prevent or ensure that certain people will fulfil certain roles.213 If 
McMahan is going to be consistent and say that combatants who avoid battle based 
solely on luck are liable then surely those who have avoided being on the battle field 
altogether through luck should also be liable. For, just like the combatants who don’t 
engage in combat, if the civilians’ luck had gone the other way then they would be 
posing a threat. Thus McMahan cannot use luck to show that most unjust combatants are 
liable to attack as this criterion will extend to include unjust noncombatants who are 
simply lucky not to be combatants. Relying on luck means that McMahan reinforces the 
dilemma as he opens his theory up to the total war objection.  
3.3.2  Epistemic difficulties 
Strawser focuses on epistemic difficulties as another way to resist the contingent 
pacifism horn.  Chiefly, Strawser claims that the epistemic problems that Lazar raises for 
the responsibility account are also going to be applicable to other cases of liability 
justification such as self-defence.214 He supposes that you are strolling down the street 
when a stranger charges at you with a knife, attempting to stab you.215 Strawser observes 
that you do not need to know with certainty the personal history, decision to fight and so 
forth of the attacker in order to permissibly defend yourself from them whilst walking 
down street. Strawser admits that not knowing these details means that you are not going 
to know with certainty whether the stranger is liable to attack, yet the “possibility of 
mistake does not negate the evidence you have for the stranger’s liability”.216 Rather, the 
evidence that you do have is going to be relevant for the permissibility of defensive 
force. So, for instance, you should be able to discern: whether you have done anything to 
make yourself liable to attack; whether the attacker may have some other justification for 
attacking you - perhaps a lesser evil justification; and whether the attacker is morally 
responsible.217 Strawser thinks that with this evidence most would think you are justified 
in determining that the attacker is liable and that it is thereby permissible to defend 
yourself. The implication here is that if it is possible for the epistemic hurdles to be 
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overcome in cases of self-defence it will also be possible to overcome those hurdles in 
cases of war. This is because, for McMahan and Strawser, the difference between 
individual self-defence and war is one of degree, not kind. The only difference for war is 
that it must be known that one has a just cause, and whilst this is difficult, Strawser 
maintains that it is possible. So according to Strawser, because Lazar presumably thinks 
you can overcome the epistemic barrier in individual self-defence, then you should be 
able to overcome it in war.  
 
Unfortunately for Strawser and McMahan, I do not think this line of argument helps the 
responsibility account negotiate the dilemma as much as they would like. The reason for 
this is because it does not matter what Lazar or others would think about the case of the 
attacker with the knife. Rather what is important is what the responsibility account says 
about the attacker with the knife. The permissibility that Strawser alleges Lazar has for 
self-defence could be based upon another theory, which would not lend support to the 
responsibility account at all. For instance it could be the case that people think self-
defence in the example Strawser gives is justified because of a Hobbesian account of 
self-defence. Strawser has not shown that Lazar, and others, would think that the 
responsibility account allows for permissible defence against the attacked.218 And it 
seems to me that the responsibility account does struggle with Strawser’s example. The 
reason for this, and a large problem for any responsibility based account, is that it is 
going to be difficult to determine whether someone is actually morally responsible for 
their actions and not coerced. The coercion point is particularly relevant, for, as Frankfurt 
notes: “It is generally agreed that a person who has been coerced to do something … is 
not morally responsible for having done it.”219 Further, the contingent pacifist objection 
is not committed, as Strawser seems to think, to the impossibility of determining liability. 
This should be clear from the title of the objection: the contingency comes from the 
difficulty, not the impossibility, of adequately and accurately determining liability. And 
the fact that Strawser admits “there will usually be more uncertainty in war cases than in 
self-defence cases” lends support to the contingent pacifist who is more opposed to 
defensive force in war than in cases of self-defence. This increased uncertainty in war 
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extends beyond determining the evidence relating to the attacker. This is because the 
certainty you have that you are innocent (as the victim) does not apply in war as it is 
harder to determine whether your side is innocent or not. So it seems that even if it is 
possible to determine liability in cases of self-defence, this does not transfer smoothly to 
cases of war. This reinforces the epistemic difficulties of determining liability in war and 
consequently reinforces the contingent pacifism horn of the dilemma. 
3.4  Responses to the Total War Horn 
My arguments above should serve to show that the contingent pacifism horn of the 
dilemma is intact. I will now turn to the responses of Strawser and McMahan to the total 
war horn of the dilemma. McMahan observes that many of the ways in which unjust 
noncombatants contribute to an unjust war “almost never make an essential causal 
contribution to the killing of another person in war.”220 From these observations 
McMahan makes three distinct claims that support noncombatants’ lack of liability that I 
will outline then reject in turn. Strawser’s objections are very similar to McMahan’s so I 
will consider them together. 
3.4.1  Neglible contribution 
The first point McMahan and Strawser make is that many of the actions that 
noncombatants are responsible for are “indirect” and “foreseeably negligible” which 
means they do not make a significant causal difference to the prosecution of the war.221 
This is particularly true for contributions such as voting and protesting, where, McMahan 
argues, it is doubtful that the morally preferable action - voting or protesting against the 
war - would make any causal difference.222 As we saw above, McMahan identifies the 
degree of a person’s contribution to a harm as relevant to determining their liability. If a 
person’s action makes a negligible causal contribution then it is going to be difficult for 
McMahan to ascribe any liability to them.  
 
The problem with this claim is that it leads to another counterfactual quandry. A 
plausible way to measure the causal contribution of your action to the outcome is to 
imagine what might have happened if you had not performed the action. When thinking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 McMahan, ‘Who is Morally Liable to be Killed in War’, p. 549. 
221 Strawser, ‘Walking the Tightrope of Just War’, p. 540. 
222 McMahan, ‘Who is Morally Liable to be Killed in War’, p. 550. 
70	  
	  
about voting it seems clear that an individual’s vote makes little to no difference to the 
outcome. The chant of one individual at a protest is similarly unlikely to influence an 
outcome. The implication is that if our actions do not make a difference regarding an 
outcome’s occurrence it is difficult to say we are responsible for it. This is because 
anything we did or did not do made no difference. However this counterfactual test 
throws up results that reduce liability in other cases too. Think back to the mafia boss 
hiring hit men. If any particular hit man turned down the contract then another would 
take it up and the hit would be carried out. This means that for the hit man who does take 
the job, their action makes no difference to the outcome, for if they had not killed the 
target, another hit man would have. This is problematic for McMahan because he would 
want, at the least, to attribute agent-responsibility to the hitman. The test for determining 
the causal contribution of action that McMahan wants to use to undermine the 
importance of noncombatants’ contributions similarly undermines the contributions of 
those who are clearly responsible.   
 
Of course there is the sense that the actions of the hit man resulted in him being the 
person causally responsible for the death of the target. The causal outcome would be 
different if another hit man had taken the job. This rejoinder highlights the area in which 
the negligible contribution response misses the point of the responsibility account. It is 
not how much one contributes to the threat, but the degree to which one is responsible for 
the threat coming about that is relevant. Remember that the size of contribution and 
degree of responsibility do not necessarily mirror each other. Focusing on a 
counterfactual where the size of contribution is easily imagined away misses that point. 
The examples of the tradesman and the mafia boss in Section 3.1 above served to show 
that point. This means that Strawser and McMahan cannot use the size of the contribution 
as a proxy for responsibility and argue that because civilian contributions are negligible 
that they are then non-responsible and not liable to attack. With this clarified we are back 
to the original point of the contingent pacifism horn: there will be a range of 
responsibility among both combatants and noncombatants and the epistemic difficulties 
of determining this will again be problematic.  
3.4.2  Justified contributions  
For his second response to the total war horn McMahan argues that many of the 
contributions, such as taxes or personal wealth, to the economic strength of a state are not 
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only compelled or unavoidable but are also morally justified.223 This is because of the 
welfare for the vulnerable, essential infrastructure, and worthy goods that are enabled as 
a result of these. For McMahan, moral justification for a particular act exempts liability 
on the basis of that act. This means that performing these morally justified acts will not 
result in liability.  
 
I dispute the claim that they are morally justified. The main reason for this is because 
many of the contributions support the wrongs of a state, which as McMahan mentions, 
would require more than a full time job to protest. Just because some of the contributions 
go towards worthy aims does not necessarily make them justified. The example of the 
conscientious mob boss should serve again to illustrate this point. Further, imagine that 
the mob boss funds his affairs through running a protection racket - the money he uses is 
compelled. The fact that some of the money goes to worthy projects does not on its own 
justify the money which also goes to other not so worthy, criminal projects. When the 
money is taken there is no way to determine what in particular it is going to contribute 
towards, which means that it is best understood as funding the activities as a whole. It 
could be the case that an all things considered judgement would take into account the 
good actions and the bad actions undertaken by the conscientious mob boss and 
determine that the good outweighs the bad, thereby justifying the contributions. Whilst 
these calculations are going to be different for every state, it is going to be the case that 
unjust states will struggle to satisfy all things considered judgements, given they are 
engaging in unjust activities. Even if we assume that the only wrongs states engage in are 
wars and that similar contributions in the past only went to good projects this would not 
change the egregious wrong that the state is currently engaged in and that unjust 
noncombatants’ contributions are currently supporting. Considering the wrongs that a 
state commits highlights the extra work to be done by McMahan to show that the 
contributions of citizens are morally justified, thereby excusing them of liability. I am 
sceptical that such work can be done, especially for warring states. 
3.4.3  Ineffectiveness  
A key point that both McMahan and Strawser make in response to Lazar is that of the 
ineffectiveness of targeting unjust noncombatants.224 This derives from the 
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aforementioned claim that individual civilians do not make more than a negligible causal 
contribution. I will rebut this claim in the next chapter in Section 4.4.3.  
3.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have defended Lazar’s Responsibility Dilemma from the rebuttal of 
McMahan and Strawser. After outlining the dilemma I argued that the additional 
categories McMahan introduced did not help to determine liability. I then argued that 
McMahan’s reliance on luck prevented him from escaping the contingent pacifism horn. 
Similarly Strawser’s claim that the epistemic difficulties were easily overcome did not 
address the problems that the responsibility account faced. I also rebutted Strawser and 
McMahan’s arguments that the negligible and justified contributions of unjust 
noncombatants affected their liability. My rebuttals mean that the responsibility dilemma 




4.  Collective Responsibility and Liability 
to Attack 
So far the discussion has followed McMahan’s focus on individuals and their duties and 
obligations during a war. In particular I have focused on when and under what 
circumstances an individual is liable to be harmed. In this chapter I am going to change 
focus and address a challenge articulated by Noam Zohar. In several papers Zohar 
questions the individualist perspective assumed by McMahan.225 In particular Zohar 
argues against McMahan (and Judith Jarvis Thomson) in favour of a collectivist 
perspective and in support of the moral equality of combatants. I am going to depart from 
Zohar here, by granting McMahan that the moral equality of combatants is false. I am 
going to argue that war is a collective threat, and therefore requires a collectivist 
approach. I will show that this collectivist approach, when combined with a more 
thorough understanding of responsibility, supports the principle that unjust 
noncombatants can be liable to attack by just combatants. The first section of this chapter 
will therefore address the nature of the threat posed in war, and argue that it is a 
collective threat. The second section of this chapter will introduce Tony Honoré’s idea of 
outcome responsibility and show how this accommodates McMahan’s example of the 
conscientious driver. The third section will draw on work by Toni Erskine and others to 
show that collective responsibility is plausible and that outcome responsibility is 
compatible with it. The final section will show that this entails the liability of unjust 
noncombatants by addressing the problems of how to attribute and avoid outcome 
responsibility.  
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4.1 The Collective Nature of the War Time Threat 
In ‘War as Self Defense’ McMahan argues in favour of the reductive strategy, which 
“claims that national defence is reducible to the defence of individuals.” 226 The reductive 
strategy can either be interpreted to mean that national defence is either the aggregate of 
many individuals simultaneously exercising their right of self-defence or the state 
exercising that right on behalf of individuals.227 In Killing in War, McMahan has 
developed this view, claiming that “just warfare is much more than the mere exercise of 
rights of individual self-defence by just combatants.”228 Rather, just warfare has to 
incorporate the just cause for war, which is not necessarily a right of self-defence. So the 
reductive strategy suggests that what is wrong about war is that it violates the rights of 
individuals.  
 
The problem I have with this approach is McMahan appears to be only referring to the 
relationship between rights violation and just warfare, not the nature of the threat. We 
want a proper analysis of the nature of the threat (as opposed to the justification for 
defence), as it is responsibility for an unjust threat that forms McMahan’s criterion for 
attack in war. McMahan’s focus on individual responsibility seems to suggest that he 
views the threats posed in war as similar to aggregated rights violations; that is a threat in 
war just is when enough individuals work together in a group to threaten another group 
of individuals. This is supported in an early paper where he says: “War is a morally 
special condition only in that the number of people that it causes to render themselves 
non-innocent vis-a-vis one another is abnormally large.”229 As such, according to 
McMahan, determining the responsibility of individuals in war will be as simple as 
determining the contributions of each individual to the threat.  
 
This is not going to be sufficient in explaining the wartime threat. It is too simplistic to 
reduce the actions of a state going to war as simply the aggregate actions of 
individuals.230 There are two main reasons for this. First, and most importantly, the 
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structure of the group in which individuals act allows them to do things that they would 
have not been able to do by themselves.231 Reducing the threat of a state to individual 
actions misses the point that individuals are only able to act as they do due to the co-
operation of others in the state. The second reason is that when individuals act in a way 
that contributes to the threat posed to another state it is very rare that they will be acting 
on their own volition and representing themselves. Rather, we understand soldiers as 
acting as representatives of the state. Indeed, soldiers in this sense are the sources of the 
vicarious action of the state.232 It is true that basic actions (such as shooting a gun) can 
only be performed by individuals. However when we have specific relationships (such as 
representation or designation) among a group, then it makes sense to say that the basic 
actions are being performed by a subgroup (e.g. the military) on behalf of the larger 
group.233 An exception to this would be when the members of the subgroup act in a way 
that they are not authorised to do by the larger group. So, for instance, if individual 
members of the military violated the laws of war we would hold the individuals, and not 
the group, accountable for these actions because violating the laws of war constitute 
acting beyond the scope of what they were authorised to do.234 
 
Larry May sums up the two main concerns when he says: “The interdependent actions of 
many people facilitate the action that is identified as the action of the state.”235 These two 
points: a) that individual action in war is only possible due to the structure of the group in 
which they act, and b) that when individuals act in war they often act on behalf of the 
group and not on their own volition, highlight the problems of thinking about war as a 
threat that is reducible to the actions of individuals. Whilst it is true that individuals carry 
out a war, it is misleading to think of any particular combatant as merely an individual 
agent.236 We can only fully understand the actions of a combatant in war as an action on 
behalf of a group and, as Zohar says: “It is only as part of that effort that his action can (if 
at all) be justified in the first place”.237 So to adequately understand the nature of the 
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threat in war we have to understand it as a threat posed by a collective, wherein 
individuals act on behalf of the collective. The group is the agent of the threat. The 
collective nature of the wartime threat means that an adequate understanding of the threat 
is going to involve an account of collective responsibility, as it is responsibility for the 
threat that McMahan is interested in. In the following section I will outline how 
McMahan’s conception of moral responsibility is in fact very similar to what Honoré has 
called ‘outcome responsibility’ which I will then link to collective responsibility.  
4.2 Outcome Responsibility and McMahan 
McMahan’s analysis criterion of liability to attack relies heavily on the concept of moral 
responsibility.  McMahan thinks that moral responsibility for an objectively unjustified 
threat is necessary for liability, while guilt and culpability are not.238 This is interesting as 
it is common to understand moral responsibility for an action as containing both causal 
responsibility and blameworthiness.239 As McMahan appears to disassociate moral 
responsibility from culpability, his account warrants a close examination. In this section I 
am going to show how McMahan’s account of moral responsibility aligns closely with 
Honoré’s account of outcome responsibility. Outcome responsibility is the attribution of 
the consequences of an agent’s actions to an agent in such a way that, other things being 
equal, the burdens and benefits of that action should fall to them.240 It is a narrower 
notion than causal responsibility, as it does not include being responsible for things that 
“arise in bizarre and unpredictable ways” such as causing a rock fall by tossing an orange 
pip over a cliff.241 It is also a wider notion than moral responsibility, as it ascribes moral 
responsibility without ascribing blame or culpability. McMahan’s example of the 
conscientious driver shows how outocome responsibility is the proper basis for liability 
to defensive harm. I will first set out McMahan’s analysis of his example, and then show 
how it aligns with outcome responsibility.  
 
I first introduced conscientious driver in Chapter Two but I will reproduce it again here:  
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“A person who always keeps her car well maintained and always drives carefully and alertly 
decides to drive to the cinema. On the way, a freak event that she could not have anticipated occurs 
that causes her car to veer out of control in the direction of a pedestrian.” 242 
 
McMahan says that from an objective perspective the driver is acting impermissibly. This 
is because if you act in such a way that you will lose control of the car and it will threaten 
an innocent person then that is impermissible.243 However from a subjective perspective 
it is permissible because the driver does not, and can not, know that those are the 
conditions under which she is driving. This is relevant because the different accounts of 
permissibility render different results when categorising the type of threat that she is. The 
objective account classifies her as an Excused Threat, whereas the subjective account 
classifies her as an Innocent Threat. This difference reflects the fact that she is “acting on 
the basis of epistemically justified but false beliefs.”244 McMahan notes that the driver 
does not intend to harm the pedestrian, nor is it foreseeable that she will harm anyone. 
McMahan also argues that though the act is subjectively permissible, it is not 
subjectively justified. This is because she has no positive moral reason to take part in the 
activity.245 This is in contrast to an ambulance driver who is driving conscientiously to an 
accident site yet suffers a similar freak accident. According to McMahan because the 
ambulance driver is driving to save a person she has a positive moral reason to undertake 
the activity, hence it is subjectively justified as well as subjectively permissible. 
 
The issue with the conscientious driver is that “she knows that driving is an activity that 
has a very tiny risk of causing great harm”.246  This risk is so small that the type of 
activity is permissible. But unfortunately she has bad luck which means that the risk that 
“she knowingly imposed ... for the sake of her own interests” has come to pass.247 This 
leads McMahan to conclude that “she is morally liable to defensive action to prevent her 
from killing an innocent bystander.”248 McMahan thinks the same result applies in the 
ambulance driver case too. 
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The important point for McMahan is that to be responsible a person must engage “in 
some form of voluntary action that had some reasonably foreseeable risk of creating a 
wrongful threat.”249 An agent can only be liable to what happens as a result of our action; 
we cannot become liable through mere luck. If two people act the same but have different 
results we might say that this difference comes down to luck, but it is not mere luck. 
McMahan characterises this as moral luck, a luck that comes into play as the result of our 
actions and that is reasonably foreseeable.250 Because the conscientious driver is 
responsible for action that imposed the foreseeable risk of inflicting harm on others, it is 
fair that the driver and not the innocent pedestrian should suffer the costs of the harm. 
The driver and not the pedestrian is responsible for bringing about the costs. 
Unfortunately, in this case, the nature of the harm means that it cannot be divided 
between the two agents. The responsibility that the driver has for the harm means that she 
should bear the costs. There is an asymmetry between the two in respect to 
responsibility.251 If the harm was divisible then the slightness of the asymmetry might 
mean that it is not fair to impose all of the costs on one of the parties. However because 
there is a forced choice in the conscientious driver case somebody has to bear all the 
costs and it fair for the person responsible for the threat of harm to bear that cost.  
 
It is this inclusion of luck that highlights the closesness of outcome responsibility to 
McMahan’s analysis of the conscientious driver. This idea of luck is integral to outcome 
responsibility and is an important aspect in justifying appropriate outcomes for our 
actions. Outcome responsibility recognises that luck plays an essential part in 
determining how our actions ‘play out’ in the world. Honoré thinks that if we are to use a 
system of luck to justify outcome allocation it must be fair. Part of the reason the system 
is fair is that whilst it entails that “we bear the risk of bad luck we also benefit if our luck 
is good.”252 So in the case of the conscientious driver she ordinarily benefits from her 
good luck by attending the cinema, or whatever other action her driving is for. Honoré 
argues that we implicitly bet on outcomes during everyday life, and frequently take risks 
for which we claim the benefit or the cost:253 “To choose and execute a course of conduct 
is to bet on your skill and judgement of the probabilities. Choosing is inescapably 
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betting.”254 This applies to both action and inaction.255 Honoré also argues that such a 
system is also fair because it is, over time, beneficial. The potential benefits will usually 
outweigh the potential costs. Mere ignorance is not sufficient to absolve responsibility. 
Honoré suggests that it might be sufficient in absolving blameworthiness and thereby 
punishment, but not outcome responsibility and a subsequent obligation to recompense 
for harm.256  
 
Outcome responsibility seems to be the kind of responsibility McMahan has in mind 
when he discusses the responsibility of the conscientious driver. He does not want to 
attribute blame to the driver, yet he still holds her liable to bear the costs of her risky 
action. Outcome responsibility explains how she can be responsible for the harm caused 
in such a way that the cost is hers to bear, without being at fault. This shows that, for 
McMahan, outcome responsibility is sufficient to ground liability for defensive harm. 
Because McMahan does not think that the morality pertaining to war is different to that 
pertaining to ordinary self-defence, if outcome responsibility is sufficient to ground 
liability in ordinary self-defence it will also be sufficient to ground liability in cases of 
war. This means that outcome responsibility is the relevant sense of responsibility to be 
using when determining whether civilians can be liable to attack.  
4.3  Collective Responsibility 
Now I want to turn to the question of whether it is appropriate to apply the notion of 
collective responsibility to groups and thereby determine whether individuals can be 
outcome responsible for the actions of the collective.  
 
Erskine argues convincingly that states are moral agents and are thereby legitimate loci 
of responsibility.257 This is controversial; many individualists maintain that persons are 
the basic unit of ethical reasoning and responsibility.258 Erskine disagrees with this. She 
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thinks that some institutions and states do possess relevant capacities that render it 
coherent to assign responsibility to them.259 In particular she identifies the capacities of 
moral deliberation and moral action as fundamental to responsibility. In determining 
whether these capacities apply to international actors she draws on the Peter French’s 
distinction between “aggregate collectivity” and “conglomerate collectivity”.260 An 
aggregate collectivity is a group that is simply a collection of people. A change in the 
membership necessarily results in a change in identity of the group. This is in contrast 
with a conglomerate collectivity which is more than simply the “sum of its 
constituents.”261 The identity of a conglomerate collectivity is therefore independent of its 
membership at any particular time. Examples include political parties, sports clubs, 
corporations, transnational organisations and so on.262 A further characteristic of a 
conglomerate collectivity is that it has “internal organizations and/or decision 
procedures.”263 This is particularly pertinent to Erskine as it requires that the collective 
be able to deliberate and to display “a degree of decision-making unity that would allow 
the collectivity in question to arrive at a predetermined goal”.264 The criterion of a 
decision-making function thereby means a collectivity is capable of purposive and 
coordinated action. French also stipulates that a conglomerate collectivity has an identity 
over time, which eliminates spontaneous groups.265 Erskine also adds that for groups to 
be candidates for moral agency they must be self-asserting, by which she means they are 
not externally defined.266  
 
These features enable Erskine to establish criteria to determine which types of groups 
count as moral agents. The criteria that she identifies are: “an identity that is more than 
the sum of the identities of its constitutive parts; … a decision making structure; an 
identity over time; and a conception of itself as a unit.”267 Groups that have these features 
are identified as “institutional moral agents” because they possess the capacities of moral 
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deliberation and moral action in ways that are analogous, but not identical, to individual 
humans.268 
 
These criteria are met by states. First, the identity of a state is distinct from the sum of its 
components. Many of the actions of a state are only able to be described as actions by the 
state. That is in a way in which is not reducible to descriptions of the actions of its 
members. Examples of these include, signing international treaties, passing legislation, 
and, I argue, waging war. Additionally the membership of a state is in a constant state of 
flux with citizens frequently immigrating, emigrating, being born, and dying. These 
changes do not ordinarily affect the identity of a state.269 Similarly, the government of a 
state is often prone to change, yet we do not view the change of the individuals in charge 
as constituting a change in the state. Quentin Skinner states this clearly when he defines 
the modern state as “an apparatus of power whose existence remains independent of 
those who may happen to have control of it at any given time.”270 With relation to the 
second criterion, the state is capable of deliberating and arriving at a course of action. 
Erskine claims that the state’s capacity for reasoning is in fact “akin to that of a human 
individual.”271 This is not to claim that states are perfectly rational actors, but rather to 
emphasise that states are capable of purposive action despite the compromise and 
questionable reasoning that often pervades politics. Individual humans are similarly 
capable of purposive action despite epistemological limitations and personal tensions 
between conflicting values and interests.272 Satisfaction of the third criterion is 
straightforward; states clearly have an identity over time. They recognise past actions and 
plan for the future.  Finally, states also satisfy the fourth criterion of being self-aware. 
This is perhaps most evident in the constitutions by which states define themselves. The 
satisfaction of the four criteria lead Erskine to say that it is possible for states to be 
institutional moral agents and thereby bearers of responsibility.273 
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Several points need to be mentioned here. First, I do not want to suggest that Erskine’s 
approach is the only way of determining collective responsibility. Other approaches such 
as Marion Smiley’s and John Parrish’s are also promising. Smiley argues for a different 
conception of agency when determining the responsibility of collectives,274 and Parrish 
argues for an ‘authorized state’ model where the state is an agent of its citizens.275 
However I do think that Erskine’s view is plausible and shows one way of understanding 
collective responsibility at the state level. I have chosen it here as I think it aligns closely 
with outcome responsibility. Second, I am not committed to the idea that states are the 
only collective group able to have responsibility. I take no position on whether mobs 
have collective responsibility. It is interesting enough for my purposes that states do, as 
they are typically the collectives that wage war. It is probable that a similar analysis will 
satisfy many of the conditions required for responsibility when applied to substate groups 
waging war against states. Third, Erskine’s analysis establishes that states as institutional 
moral agents can be morally responsible. This goes further than I require as I only need 
to establish outcome responsibility. However as noted above, because outcome 
responsibility is necessary for moral responsibility Erskine’s account also provides me 
with outcome responsibility for states. Erskine’s capacity based account of institutional 
moral agency aligns closely with Honoré’s capacity based account of outcome 
responsibility. Indeed, Honoré sees no reason why groups such as states cannot be 
outcome responsible as they are perfectly capable of exposing themselves to risk.276  
4.3.1  The distribution of collective responsibility to individuals 
Assuming that I have established that states can be responsible for their actions, a key 
issue is whether, if at all, that responsibility is distributed to individuals. I mentioned 
above that Erskine argues that some duties and responsibilities are only able to be borne 
by states; that is they are not able to be distributed to individuals.277 An example of this is 
the duty not to wage a war of aggression. This is a duty that an individual is unable to 
violate, in part because an individual cannot wage a war (nor, as I argued above, can the 
simple aggregate of individuals actions amount to war). If Erskine is correct, then this 
leaves us with a problem. If responsibility is unable to be distributed past the state then it 
is unclear how we should understand the moral status of the citizens of that state. If they 
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are not responsible, who do we hold to account? Recall that our focus is on distributing 
the costs of harmful action. It is here that the notion of outcome responsibility becomes 
particularly pertinent. I think Erskine’s worry about distributing responsibility is 
misplaced. Whilst we may not be able to fully distribute the responsibility for the state’s 
actions, we can recognise that individuals have contributed to an action that has led to 
harm. Because individuals are outcome responsible for their actions it is plausible to 
distribute the outcome responsibility for the collective act to them, even if we do not or 
cannot distribute the moral responsibility of the collective act. Of course it might be the 
case that Erskine is mistaken and that it is possible to distribute moral responsibility for 
state acts, either to leaders and other individuals who influenced the decision of the state 
to commit the wrongful action, or perhaps, following Tracey Isaacs’ claim that “acts 
inherit the moral quality of the whole”,278 more generally to those who made even small 
contributions. However, simply recognising that individuals are outcome responsible for 
their collective actions allows us to fairly distribute the costs of collective actions among 
individuals. The reason that this is fair is because those individuals typically get the 
benefits of the collective actions. When considering their contributions to the state, 
citizens typically benefit from state administered social services, security and so on. 
Outcome responsibility says that people should take responsibility when what they 
contribute to goes foreseeably wrong and it is foreseeable that states sometimes (if not 
frequently) wage unjust wars. This leads to the conclusion that individuals can be 
outcome responsible for the harm posed when their state goes to war. 
4.4  Objections to Individuals being Outcome Responsible for 
Collective Action 
There are several objections that I can foresee arising in regard to this claim. Clarifying 
and responding to these objections will outline some of the circumstances where 
individuals might not be outcome responsible for the harm posed by their state.  
4.4.1 Responsibility via mere membership 
The first objection is raised by McMahan when he considers whether people can be liable 
to (or immune from) attack by virtue of their membership in a particular group.279 He 
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quotes Primo Levi who says: “I do not understand, I cannot tolerate the fact that a man 
should be judged not for what he is but because of the group to which he happens to 
belong.”280 McMahan identifies the word ‘happens’ as crucial here. He argues that 
sometimes a voluntary choice to become part of a group can ground liability, particularly 
if the terms of the membership include taking responsibility for the collective actions of 
the group.281 But if the membership of a particular group is involuntary, and this would 
apply to most citizens of states as citizenship is not something we generally choose, then 
mere membership is not going to be a basis for liability.  
 
I do not think McMahan’s objection is successful against the account I have described 
above. This is because his argument is consistent with my account. I am not arguing for 
the conclusion that mere membership is a basis for liability to attack. I am arguing for 
outcome responsibility as grounding liability. In the context of collective responsibility 
we are outcome responsible for our acts (and omissions) insofar as they contribute in 
some relevant way to the outcomes of the collective action. People are not going to be 
responsible simply because of membership. Young children, for instance, are members of 
the collective. Yet because they are not in a position to act they are not going to be 
outcome responsible for the actions of the state. So, McMahan is right that mere 
membership is not a base for liability, but this does not refute the claim that an outcome 
responsible act (or omission) as a contribution to collective action is a basis for being 
liable. The second part to McMahan’s objection, the insistence on voluntary membership 
of the group, is also misguided. The problem with this claim is that it ignores the fact of 
life that we often find ourselves in situations over which we have no control, and yet are 
required to act. The fact that we did not voluntarily place ourselves in these situations, 
that they were handed to us by the fates so to speak, does not diminish our obligations or 
minimise our responsibility. Consider a case where you are walking with some friends 
through a forest and come across a child being slowly crushed to death by a fallen tree. 
The tree is too heavy to be moved by any one person, but together with your friends it 
would be straightforward to manoeuvre the tree and save the child. It is of course true 
that you did not voluntarily choose to be in a situation where the life of the child was in 
the hands of your party. However by chance you are in such a position and it seems clear 
that the group is outcome responsible for the fate of the child. This would be true even if 
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your group would be late for some important event. We often have no control over the 
circumstances we find ourselves in, yet it seems our duties and obligations to others still 
apply in these situations. So even though we have no control over the state we are born 
into, we still have obligations towards others, through collective outcomes that we 
contribute to. As Miller says: “My responsibilities are thrust upon me by circumstances, 
but they do not cease to be my responsibilities because of that.”282 So it is clear that 
voluntary entry is not required to be responsible for the actions of a group.  
 
4.4.2 Is it possible to avoid outcome responsibility for collective action? 
The second objection draws on a point made by Narveson. Arguing against irreducible 
collective responsibility, he claims that in any particular group there are likely to be 
many individuals who either refrained from the horrific action in question or actively 
went out of their way to oppose it. As such irreducible collective responsibility will entail 
“laying blame on someone who is not only innocent, but possibly praiseworthy in the 
extreme.”283 Now the sense of responsibility I am advocating in this chapter is not 
irreducible, nor does it seek to lay blame or praise. Nevertheless Narveson’s point is 
relevant because it brings to the fore this important question: Is it possible to avoid being 
outcome responsible for contributions made to collective action? Narveson’s challenge 
forces us to deal with attributing outcome responsibility to those who do not actively 
support a state’s actions and those who vehemently oppose it. I will first look at outcome 
responsibility for those who do not actively participate then, address what is required to 
avoid outcome responsibility.  
4.4.2.1 Attributing outcome responsibility to the inactive and the 
opposed 
Miller provides a compelling account as to why mere inactivity will not relieve 
individuals of their group-based responsibility. He refers to Feinberg’s discussion of 
postbellum racism in the American South.284 In this environment violent acts against 
blacks were undertaken in a context where Southern whites were generally passively 
sympathetic to such acts, even if not undertaking them themselves. There was a shared 
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culture of racial inequality that led to solidarity among whites, even amongst those who 
might not have approved of the lynchings. This leads Miller to claim “that where a 
community of people shares a set of cultural values, one of whose effects is to encourage 
behaviour that results in outcome O, then everyone who belongs to the community shares 
in the responsibility for O, even if they disapprove of it.”285 Participation in the 
community helps to “sustain the climate of opinion” that leads to the actions in question 
happening. This seems to apply particularly to the modern United States. There is a 
culture in the United States of ‘American Exceptionalism,’ whereby Americans view 
themselves as a different from other states, and world leaders in democratic progress. 
Conservative politicians in particular use this rhetoric to justify an expansive and 
aggressive foreign policy.286 Even though many Americans are critical of this kind of 
foreign policy they can be thought to be responsible for participating in a community 
where this culture is encouraged. So it seems clear that passive inactivity is not going to 
enable a person to avoid responsibility for collective actions. Something more is 
required. 
 
I will now address Narveson’s most forceful claim; that there are those who actively 
oppose the wrongful actions committed by their group. Addressing this claim will help 
elaborate what is required to avoid collective responsibility. I want to start first by 
considering the case of the dissenting minority. Miller gives the case of an employee-
controlled company whose processing plant pollutes a river.287 The employees discuss 
whether to introduce a more expensive process to reduce the pollution or to continue with 
the status quo. Opinion is divided, but the majority favours the status quo and so the 
factory continues to pollute. Miller claims that the employees are collectively responsible 
for the damage they cause and if they are required to pay costs to clean up the pollution 
then all employees should bear those costs.288 The reason for this is that the dissenting 
minority are still outcome responsible for the actions of the collective. They are treated 
fairly, getting the benefits, such as income, that come with the job and have a fair chance 
to influence the decisions of the company. As such they must be prepared to “carry their 
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share of the costs” that result from the company’s decisions.289 It would not be 
appropriate to blame or punish them for the pollution, but they are still outcome 
responsible and therefore liable to bear the costs. Being a member of a dissenting 
minority and voting against a policy is therefore not a sufficient way to avoid outcome 
responsibility. (Indeed, a key aspect of democratic theory is that the losing side be bound 
by the result.290)  
 
This translates easily to states; Anna Stilz for example has argued that citizens of 
democracies are collectively responsible for the actions of their states.291 The key for 
Miller here though is that the decision making process be fair, and it is here that 
comparisons with non-democratic states run into trouble. If the company example is 
changed so that the decision-making is made by a select few who do not inform the other 
shareholders of their decisions then it would not be appropriate to attribute responsibility 
for the decision to the general worker as she was not involved in making the decision. 
Rather collective responsibility would extend only to the decision making group.292 
When applying this reasoning to states it implies, plausibly, that citizens of states that are 
not democracies are not going to be responsible for the actions of the state as they have 
little influence over the decision making of the state.293 This is going to be true in some 
cases but not all. The instance where it is not going to be true is where the decisions of 
the autocracies reflect the national will.294 In these cases the shared national culture will 
be sufficient to ground responsibility for the action. Examples of states like these might 
be Middle Eastern monarchies where many social outcomes are supported by large 
percetages of the population, even though they had no role in the decision making 
process. These cases are more similar to the postbellum South and show that 
responsibility for collective action does not depend upon active support for the action. 
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4.4.2.2 Avoiding collective outcome responsibility 
How then is one to avoid being collectively responsible for a group action? Miller 
acknowledges that it is difficult to clearly state exactly what is required beyond that a 
person “must take all reasonable steps to prevent the outcome occurring.”295 The reason 
this is so imprecise is because what is reasonable is going to depend upon the particulars 
of each case. An important factor that is going to be variable is the costs that different 
forms of action will impose on dissenters. Miller has us again consider the case of the 
postbellum South. If a person joined the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, took part in anti-racism demonstrations and because of these actions 
suffered hostility from their neighbours, then Miller thinks they have surely done enough 
to avoid being responsible.296 Similarly if another person started taking part in similar 
activities but then received serious threats from racist groups as to the safety of their 
home and family then they should also be exempted from responsibility.297 Threats like 
that are not ones that we reasonably expect an average person to bear. If some do decide 
to bear those costs then we call them heroic, but as Miller says: “our judgments of 
responsibility must be based on (admittedly imprecise) judgments about what can 
reasonably be expected of people in general, not on what exceptional individuals are able 
to achieve.”298  
 
When determining how individuals are to avoid responsibility for state action two factors 
seem particularly relevant: coercion (as mentioned above) and propaganda. State 
coercion can put a high cost on dissent. This is in part helped by states which claim a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and history demonstrates that they are not afraid 
to use this force, often against nonviolent protestors. Recent examples of this include 
Russia, China, Syria, Belarus and Myanmar. On the flipside, many nonviolent protests 
have been successful; witness the regime changes that marked the end of the Cold War. 
The challenge for citizens is determining whether dissent is feasible and whether 
sufficient numbers of people can act together to make the dissent effective. It is difficult 
to have knowledge of these factors prior to the fact, and then weigh these against the cost 
of the dissent. The only cases where this is a straightforward calculation is where the cost 
of dissent is minimal. If states allow free exercise of speech and assembly, as New 
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Zealand does, then we should reasonably expect citizens to protest injustices performed 
by the state.299 However if countries do not allow such liberties then it is not so clear that 
we can reasonably expect citizens to protest. It is apparent that there needs to be a 
distinction made between democracies and authoritarian regimes, with some states 
occupying intermediate positions on the scale. In democracies such as New Zealand, 
ordinary citizens are more likely to be outcome responsible for the actions of their state 
as we can reasonably expect citizens to dissent due to the minimal costs. In extreme 
authoritarian states such as North Korea ordinary citizens are most likely never going to 
be outcome responsible for the actions of the state as protest bears so heavy costs. 
According to North Korea’s official news agency Kim Jong Un’s uncle and second in 
command was recently executed for, among other things, “half-heartedly clapping”.300 In 
such an environment resistance is unreasonably risky.301  
 
North Korea also provides a good example of the problems of propaganda. Citizens are 
subject to an intensive propaganda programme, which means that it is difficult to claim 
that the views of North Koreans are genuine. This is relevant because the state may try to 
pass responsibility to citizens by claiming that state actions align with popular will. 
Indeed, the election results of North Korea give near unanimous support for the ruling 
party. Whilst North Korea is an extreme example, there have been many other 
personality cults, such as those of Stalin and Hitler, and more conventional regimes 
where states control news sources and propaganda is widespread. Miller reminds us that 
“where current political attitudes can be directly traced to sustained propaganda efforts 
by an autocratic regime that allows no dissenting voices to be heard … it is much less 
plausible to hold ordinary people responsible for the consequences that follow.”302 It 
seems plausible that such a concern can apply to some democratic regimes too. An 
example of this is the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the justificatory 
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propaganda put forward by the Israeli state. It seems that such a concern is going to 
operate on a scale and the freedom of press in Israel is going to counter somewhat the 
efforts of the state leaving Israeli citizens much more likely to be responsible than North 
Koreans. In general though it seems that the more open a state is then the lower the costs 
of dissent will be, as well as the likelihood and effectiveness of propaganda. As such, the 
more open a state is the more justified we are going to be in holding its members 
responsible for its decisions and policies.303 
4.4.3 The effectiveness of attacking civilians 
A problem for McMahan is that if noncombatants are outcome responsible for the unjust 
threat of harm their state poses, then this entails that they might be liable to military 
attack in war. In Section 3.4.3 I noted that Strawser and McMahan both think that 
noncombatants are generally not going to be liable to attack in war because targeting 
them would be an ineffective way of pursuing the just cause. I will now rebut this claim. 
 
The reason that Strawser and McMahan give for noncombatants not being liable is 
because individually they do not make more than a negligible causal contribution to the 
harm. This means that that “military attacks against civilians generally cannot be an 
effective means of pursuing a just cause.”304 If it is not an effective means of countering 
the unjust threat then it should not be pursued. In contrast, targeting unjust combatants is 
an effective means of countering the unjust threat, which explains why they should be 
targeted and not noncombatants. 
 
The specific reason that attacking noncombatants is not going to be effective is because 
“killing them cannot be directly effective as a means of averting a wrongful threat in the 
way that killing in self-defense is.” If you kill someone in self-defence then you are 
killing the person posing the threat; their death is almost guaranteed to result in the 
negation of the threat. McMahan does not think that civilians are like this though, for the 
reason that the contributions they make “to the threats their state poses in war often lie in 
the past and can no longer be prevented.”305 So, the contribution they made to the 
instigation of the war can no longer be prevented. Therefore, McMahan concludes, “the 
only way that killing civilians can [generally] serve as a means of averting an unjust 
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threat is indirectly, through affecting the action of others”.306 This would be done by 
prompting survivors of such attacks to put pressure on the government to end the war for 
fear that they too will die. The problem with such a strategy is that it is notoriously 
unreliable. McMahan notes that the use of such tactics by the British and the Germans 
during World War II had the opposite effect, and in fact strengthened resolve in the face 
of a hated enemy.307  
 
I think that this argument misunderstands the nature of the threat that noncombatants 
pose. As I have argued, the nature of the threat they pose is a collective threat; something 
they pose in virtue of the contributions that each individual makes in relation to the 
contributions of other individuals. It would be impossible to conduct a war without a 
material contribution from the civilian population. McMahan has misunderstood the 
relevant ways in which noncombatants continue to make contributions to the war threat. 
They do not merely contribute to the instigation of the war. Indeed, this is reflected in the 
way that noncombatants are generally attacked in war. It is very rare in war that any 
individual civilian is targeted as a result of the direct threat they pose (with an exception 
being assassination attempts on heads of state). Rather, multiple civilians are targeted at a 
time because it is together that they constitute a very real threat. This is why we see the 
targeting of key military infrastructure such as munitions factories or steel works during 
war time. These institutions and the people working in them contribute to the unjust 
threat as they provide the material with which the threats are materialised. The nature of 
a collective threat on the scale of war is not as immediate as a typical case of individual 
self-defence. This means that an example of an effective response to a collective threat 
would be bombing an essential munitions factory.  It would be effective because it would 
mitigate the future aggregated threat that comes from production of munitions. Indeed, 
depending on the situation, targeting noncombatants and noncombatant infrastructure 
might actually be more effective at negating the unjust threat than killing frontline troops. 
A situation where this would be the case would be a state that has a large population, and 
thus easily replaceable frontline troops, but not many essential assets, such as ore mines, 
that if destroyed would mitigate the threat by shutting down the capacity of the country. 
This shows how killing unjust noncombatants can be an effective means to avert the 
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unjust threat in a way that does not rely on making civilians put pressure on their 
government to end the war. 
 
It is worth recalling that the aim of outcome responsibility is to fairly determine where 
the costs and benefits of outcomes that we are at least agent-responsible for should fall. 
Because just combatants are in no way responsible for the harm they face in war, the 
indivisible cost should fall upon those who are responsible. I have shown above that the 
effectiveness of attacking unjust noncombatants as a means of averting the threat of war 
does not depend upon influencing the wills of others. It can also be effective in materially 
hindering the ability of the unjust state to continue to pose the unjust threat. It should be 
clarified that this entails that only when it is effective will it be permissible to attack 
unjust noncombatants (though total slaughter would be an effective but almost certain 
disproportionate means of negating an unjust threat). Their outcome responsibility for the 
unjust threat does not necessarily make them liable to blame or punishment. Unjust 
noncombatants who are only outcome responsible are not liable to be killed wantonly. 
They are only liable when doing so will be an effective way of negating the threat. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued for a collectivist understanding of the threat of war. This led 
me to develop an account of collective outcome responsibility based on the claim that 
outcome responsibility is the relevant sense of responsibility for McMahan’s account. I 
then argued for noncombatants being collectively outcome responsible for the harms 
their state poses. After considering some objections I have concluded that unjust 





In this thesis I have explored some contemporary issues in jus in bello, focusing on the 
work of Jeff McMahan. Killing in War has established itself as one of the cornerstone 
texts on the ethics of war and the arguments it has raised for our understanding the 
morality of war are central to the debate. As a phenomenon, war shows little sign of 
disappearing, with recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Sudan. Indeed, as I 
do my final editing, the news is coming through that the Russian Parliament has 
authorised their troops to occupy parts of Ukraine. In order to appropriately respond to 
these events an understanding of the moral permissibility of these conflicts is vital. Each 
of my chapters deals with a distinct issue relating to the moral permissibility of war and 
thus, I hope, contributes to the wider debate. In particular, my final chapter’s conclusions 
about the permissibility of intentionally targeting noncombatants has important 
implications for the way we conduct war as it has the result that far more people are 
liable to attack than previously though. 
 
The issues raised by McMahan are distinct enough to each warrant particular attention. 
The structure of my thesis was such that it divided into two halves. The first half focused 
on McMahan’s developments of specific in bello issues; determining who is liable to 
attack and proportionality. The second half had a contrasting focus. There I looked at 
implications of McMahan’s account of liability to attack; in particular I highlighted 
concerns raised by Lazar’s responsibility dilemma and then looked at how McMahan’s 
understanding of responsibility entailed noncombatant liability when understood 
collectively.  
 
My first chapter discussed McMahan’s account of liability to attack and his criticisms of 
the traditional view. Benbaji’s problem of the sleeping soldiers brought the issue of 
innocent threats to the fore and I suggested that separate principles governing the 
permissibility of self-defense when all parties are innocent could run parallel to 
McMahan’s responsibility focused account. Applying McMahan’s account to the in bello 
condition of discrimination highlighted the problems with the moral equality of 
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combatants. I also refuted Thomas Hurka’s waiver based argument for the moral equality 
of combatants. 
 
The second chapter traced the recent development of the in bello proportionality 
requirement. I followed the understanding of proportionality from Sidgwick and Walzer, 
through Hurka to the innovations of McMahan and Rodin. I argued that McMahan’s 
introduction of narrow and wide proportionality and the factors of intention and liability 
as relevant to the proportionality condition were innovative, but did not go far enough. 
Rodin’s account introduced significantly more factors as well as a way to understand 
their relationship. After considering a problem inspired by Hobbes, that of the practical 
difficulty of determining and weighing multiple factors, I concluded that Rodin’s 
approach was the most comprehensive, and therefore preferred, account of 
proportionality. 
 
My third chapter defended Lazar’s responsibility dilemma from the rebuttals of 
McMahan and Strawser. I argued that four of the factors McMahan introduced in an 
attempt to clarify liability had problems. This meant that he was unable to differentiate 
between combatants and noncombatants with regards to differing levels of responsibility 
for an unjust threat. I also considered some specific objections to both the contingent 
pacifism horn and total war horn and found them all wanting.  
 
My final chapter argued that unjust noncombatants can be liable to intentional attack. To 
establish this I argued for properly understanding war as a collective threat. I also used 
the example of the conscientious driver to show how McMahan’s understanding of moral 
responsibility aligned closely with Honoré’s account of outcome responsibility. After 
establishing an account of collective responsibility I argued that unjust noncombatants 
are collectively outcome responsible for the threat their state poses. As such it is often 
going to be fair that the harm they are outcome responsible for fall on them and not on 
the innocent just combatants. To establish this last claim I argued for the effectiveness of 
attacking civilians in certain situations, arguing that their ongoing contribution to the 
threat means that targeting them can be an effective means of averting the threat. 
 
My last two chapters in particular have been critical of McMahan. Whilst accepting his 
rejection of the moral equality of soldiers I have argued for a dilemma internal to his 
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work. The conclusion that it will often be permissible to intentionally target unjust 
noncombatants is one that he will presumably not be pleased with. I think this serves to 
show that the issues McMahan has argued about are far from settled and discussion of the 
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